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SUBWAY SEARCHES: WHICH EXCEPTION TO
THE WARRANT AND PROBABLE CAUSE

REQUIREMENTS APPLIES TO SUSPICIONLESS
SEARCHES OF MASS TRANSIT PASSENGERS TO

PREVENT TERRORISM?
CharlesJ. Keeley III*
INTRODUCTION

The Fourth Amendment has become increasingly important in recent
years. Modem technology continues to expand the government's capacity
to collect information about its citizens to a degree that must have been
unfathomable to the Amendment's authors. The courts have a vital role to
play in assuring that increasing surveillance by all levels of government
does not unreasonably encroach upon privacy. In an age of terrorism,
however, the courts must also take caution not to unduly restrict the ability
of citizens, acting through their government, to protect themselves against
catastrophic attack. 1
The high ridership and economic importance of urban mass transit
systems make them prime targets for terrorists. Designed to be highly
accessible, the systems are difficult to secure and, in recent years, have
proven vulnerable to terrorist attacks. 2 In response to bombings of foreign
subway and commuter rail systems by international terrorists, U.S. cities
and transit system operators have implemented security programs
subjecting passengers to random and suspicionless searches by police. 3
Suspicionless searches depart from the traditional Fourth Amendment
requirements that searches be based upon probable cause and preauthorized
by a warrant. The U.S. Supreme Court has never reviewed the routine,
suspicionless search of passengers conducted to prevent a terrorist attack on
* J.D. Candidate, 2007, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank Professor
Daniel Richman for his guidance and invaluable insight.
1. Ronald Jay Allen et al., Criminal Procedure: Investigation and Right to Counsel 334
(2005).
2. U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO Reports GAO-05-851, Passenger Rail Security:
Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts 10 (2005),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05851.pdf
[hereinafter Passenger Rail

Security].
3. See MacWade v. Kelly, No. 05CIV6921, 2005 WL 3338573, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7,

2005); American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., No. 0411652, 2004 WL 1682859, at *2 (D. Mass. July 28, 2004).
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urban mass transit systems. Lower courts have long upheld analogous
searches at airports to prevent air piracy, deeming such searches
"reasonable" after balancing the competing government and privacy
interests. 4 Yet these courts have never reached consensus on which
exception justifies departure from the warrant and probable cause
requirements. 5
While the Supreme Court has shown approval of
suspicionless airport searches, 6 it has never reviewed an airport search case
7
to clarify which exception applies.
The Supreme Court has recognized the validity of suspicionless searches
in three circumstances: administrative inspections, roadblock checkpoints
conducted by law enforcement officials, and searches that serve "special
needs." 8
In each circumstance, the warrant and probable cause
requirements are excused and the validity of a search or seizure hangs in the
Court's balancing of government and privacy interests. As municipalities
have employed suspicionless search programs on urban mass transit
systems to prevent terrorist attacks, 9 it remains unclear which exception the
Court would apply.
This Note will describe the various approaches that the Court could take
in excusing the subway searches from the warrant and probable cause
requirements. The Court might, as lower courts have done, deem the
subway searches as fitting within the administrative search doctrine, the
special needs doctrine, or the roadblock checkpoint exception. Still, the
Court could characterize the searches as consensual, or even abandon the
warrant and probable cause requirements in favor of a general
reasonableness standard. This Note concludes that none of the eligible
approaches can be used to justify the subway searches without injuring the
consistency of search and seizure jurisprudence or undermining the
protections of the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, this Note recommends
that the Court adopt a sui generis exception for antiterrorism mass transit
searches in order to enable communities to defend themselves from this
unique threat.
Part I discusses the role of individualized suspicion under the traditional
warrant preference model and under the competing general reasonableness
standard. Part I will also describe the contexts in which the Court has
permitted suspicionless searches or seizures. Part II outlines the ways in
which the Court might analyze subway searches and evaluates these
approaches. Part III argues that the adoption of a sui generis exception best
maintains the consistency of Fourth Amendment law. Finally, this Note
concludes that the political process adequately safeguards privacy when a

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

See infra Part I.C. 1.
See infra notes 332-35 and accompanying text.
See infra Part I.C.2.
See 5 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 10.6(c), at 291 n.58 (4th ed. 2004).
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37-38 (2000).

9. See infraPart I.D.
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search program equally affects a majority of a community and cedes no
discretion to officials in selecting whom to search.
I. SUSPICIONLESS SEARCHES AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

Part I.A. 1 will briefly describe the debate stemming from ambiguity in
the Fourth Amendment's text over whether all searches and seizures must
comply with the warrant procedure in order to be reasonable. It will then
describe the warrant preference rule: the Court's traditional interpretation
that all searches and seizures are subject to the warrant procedure's
strictures unless a recognized exception applies. Part I.A.2 will establish
that passengers possess a recognized privacy interest in luggage and that
this interest entitles them to the protections of the Fourth Amendment. In
Part I.A.3, this Note will discuss how requiring individualized suspicion
before a search or seizure protects privacy and limits the arbitrary use of
discretion of government officials in selecting individuals for search. Part
I.A.4 will describe the Court's introduction of a reasonableness balancing
test into Fourth Amendment analysis as an alternative to the warrant
preference rule, highlighting the role of individualized suspicion in this
competing model.
A. The Fourth Amendment
1. Original Intent and the Warrant Preference Rule
The Fourth Amendment, made binding on the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment,' 0 states that
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized. 1
The relationship between the Amendment's two clauses is not clear from
the text. One interpretation, the warrant preference model, defines the
reasonableness of a search or seizure by whether it complies with the
warrant procedure. 12 Under this view, a search or seizure is unreasonable
unless authorized by a warrant satisfying the Warrant Clause's probable
cause, oath, and particular description requirements. 13 A competing
interpretation treats the two clauses as independent. Only searches and
seizures authorized by a warrant must satisfy the Warrant Clause's
10. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650 (1961).
11. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
12. Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment's Concept of Reasonableness, 2004
Utah L. Rev. 977, 993.
13. Id.
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requirements; all others must simply be "reasonable."' 14 A third view
maintains that "unreasonable searches and seizures" refers only to those
conducted pursuant to the general warrants issued by Great Britain in the
years leading up to the founding era. 15 Under this theory, the framers did
not intend for the Amendment to regulate warrantless searches and seizures,
which were governed by common law.16
The ambiguity in the Amendment's text and the lack of consensus about
its original intent has led to inconsistency in search and seizure
jurisprudence. Traditionally, the Court has espoused a warrant preference
rule, 17 holding searches and seizures presumptively unreasonable unless
supported by a warrant and probable cause or unless a recognized exception
applies. 18 Generally, these exceptions involve exigent circumstances where
14. Id. at 999-1000. Professor Telford Taylor has argued that the framers were chiefly
concerned with abuses in the issuance of warrants. Therefore, reading the Fourth
Amendment to require warrants for all searches and seizures "stood the amendment on its
head." Telford Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 46-47 (1969). A
paradoxical consequence of Taylor's interpretation is that the government may avoid the
restrictions of the Warrant Clause simply by conducting a warrantless search or seizure.
Professor Akhil Reed Amar has attempted to explain this paradox. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth
Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 757 (1994). During the founding era,
officials conducting searches or seizures without a warrant were subject to civil actions for
trespass and false arrest. The threat that a civil jury would impose damages for unreasonable
conduct sufficiently restrained officials. Authorization by warrant, however, immunized
officials from liability. Id. at 774. The framers thus were concerned only with the issuance
of warrants, where "central officers on the government payroll in ex parte proceedings would
usurp the role of the good old jury in striking the proper balance between government and
citizen after hearing lawyers on both sides." Id
15. Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the OriginalFourth Amendment, 98 Mich. L. Rev.
547 (1999). Davies criticizes both the warrant preference model and Taylor and Amar's
interpretations as sharing the flawed assumption that the Fourth Amendment was intended to
comprehensively regulate all searches or seizures. He argues that the framers did not intend
for the Fourth Amendment to apply to warrantless searches or seizures because officials at
that time lacked authority to conduct many warrantless searches and seizures, and it was
assumed that warrants would be used. Id. at 551-552. Rather, "unreasonable searches and
seizures" referred to those authorized by general, "too-loose" warrants granting officials
wide discretion to search houses. Id. at 552. Because warrantless intrusions lay outside the
amendment's scope, it is erroneous to subject them to either the warrant requirement or to a
mere "reasonableness" requirement. Id. at 560-90. However, Davies notes that the modern
practice of vesting officials with broad discretionary authority to act without a warrant marks
a departure from the common law that was unanticipated by the framers. Id. at 668, 747-48.
He concludes that adapting the Fourth Amendment's authentic meaning to this modern
context requires "refocus[ing] attention on the critical question of what a 'right to be secure'
should mean." Id. at 750; see also David E. Steinberg, The Original Understanding of
Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 56 Fla. L. Rev. 1051, 1083 (2004) ("The most
plausible reading of the historical record leads to the following conclusion: The framers
intended that the Fourth Amendment would apply only to physical searches of residences,
pursuant to a general warrant or no warrant at all.").
16. Davies, supra note 15, at 576-83.
17. Clancy, supranote 12, at 993.
18. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) ("The point of the
Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law
enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence.
Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached
magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise
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obtaining a warrant would frustrate the purpose of the search or seizure. 19
For example, searches of automobiles based on probable cause, 2 0 searches
incident to arrest, 2 1 seizures after hot pursuit, 22 and temporary seizures of
23 all constitute recognized
luggage based on reasonable suspicion
24
exceptions to the warrant requirement.
The Court's various expressions of the warrant preference rule reveal
inconsistency in the strength of this preference over time. 25 At times, the
Court has stated that a general reasonableness standard governs Fourth
Amendment analysis and has confined the warrant and probable cause
requirements to searches by police officers for evidence to be used in a
criminal prosecution. 2 6 Many commentators have noted a trend away 27from
the warrant requirement and toward a general reasonableness standard.

of ferreting out crime. Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's
disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a
search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's
homes secure only in the discretion of police officers.... When the right of privacy must
reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by
a policeman or government enforcement agent.").
19. See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967) (requiring warrants for
building inspections because "the burden of obtaining a warrant is [not] likely to frustrate the
governmental purpose behind the search"); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156
(1925) (permitting a warrantless seizure of an automobile because securing a warrant would
not be "reasonably practicable" and seizure would be "impossible except without warrant").
20. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 151.
21. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
22. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 297-98 (1967).
23. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706 (1983).
24. This list is not exhaustive. See Elise Bjorkan Clare et al., WarrantlessSearches and
Seizures, 84 Geo. L.J. 743, 743 (1996) ("[E]xceptions include investigatory detentions,
warrantless arrests, searches incident to a valid arrest, seizure of items in plain view, exigent
circumstances, consent searches, vehicle searches, container searches, inventory searches,
border searches, searches at sea, administrative searches, and searches in which the special
needs of law enforcement make the probable cause requirement impracticable.").
25. Compare Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) ("[S]earches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions." (citations omitted)), with Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S.
326, 330 (2001) ("[The Fourth Amendment's] 'central requirement' is one of
reasonableness. In order to enforce that requirement, this Court has interpreted the
Amendment as establishing rules and presumptions designed to control conduct of law
enforcement officers that may significantly intrude upon privacy interests. Sometimes those
rules require warrants." (citation omitted)).
26. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) ("In most
criminal cases, we strike this balance in favor of the procedures described by the Warrant
Clause of the Fourth Amendment.").
27. See Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the
Fourth Amendment, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 473, 512, 529-30 (1991); Silas J. Wasserstrom, The
Court's Turn Toward a General Reasonableness Interpretationof the Fourth Amendment,
27 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 119 (1989); see also Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 571-73 (2004)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
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2. The Privacy Interest in Luggage
The privacy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment includes
anything in which a person has an actual expectation of privacy that society
is prepared to acknowledge as reasonable. 28 This protection extends to
hand-carried containers such as luggage. A traveler's luggage or bag is an
"effect" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 29 By using an
opaque container kept close at hand to store personal items, an individual
demonstrates an actual expectation of privacy. 30 This expectation remains
reasonable even if the traveler places the container in an overhead
compartment, thereby exposing it to potential contact or handling by other
passengers. 3 1 While the Court has held that police may, upon less than
probable cause, temporarily seize luggage for investigative purposes, a
32
warrantless search or extended seizure is presumptively unreasonable.
3. The Individualized Suspicion Requirement
Even when a recognized exception excuses the warrant requirement, 33 a
search or seizure usually must be justified by some individualized suspicion
of wrongdoing. 34 Ordinarily, the requisite level of individualized suspicion
is probable cause, 35 but the Court accepts a lesser quantum, reasonable
suspicion, in some circumstances. Carroll v. United States illustrates the
traditional role of individualized suspicion in Fourth Amendment
analysis. 36 The Court there concluded that police officers did not need a
warrant to search an automobile which they had stopped on the highway

28.
29.
30.
31.

Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-62 (Harlan, J., concurring).
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000).
Id.

32. Place, 462 U.S. at 706 ("[S]ome brief detentions of personal effects may be so
minimally intrusive of Fourth Amendment interests that strong countervailing governmental
interests will justify a seizure based only on specific articulable facts that the property
contains contraband or evidence of a crime."). If probable cause does exist and the luggage
is stowed in an automobile, police may search the luggage's contents along with the
automobile without a warrant. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (allowing a
warrantless search of an automobile and all containers within it where there was probable
cause that contraband was contained inside).
33. An exception can excuse the warrant requirement while demanding probable cause,
can excuse both the warrant and probable cause requirements, or, more rarely, can excuse
probable cause while still requiring a warrant. See Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the
Fourth Amendment, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1468, 1473-74 (1985) (listing twenty exceptions and
describing which requirements they excuse).

34. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 86 (2001); City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) ("A search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the
absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing."); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308
(1997) (noting that the Fourth Amendment's "restraint on government conduct generally
bars officials from undertaking a search or seizure absent individualized suspicion").
35. See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160, 175-76 (1949).

36. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925).
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and suspected of transporting illegal alcohol. 37 The Court stated the "true
rule" to be that "if the search and seizure without a warrant are made upon
probable cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of
circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other
vehicle contains [contraband], the search and seizure are valid."' 38 The
Court regarded this rule as according with what the framers "deemed an
unreasonable search and seizure" and as striking the proper balance
between public and private interests. 39 In contrast, allowing officials to
subject all motorists to "the inconvenience and indignity of such a search"
without probable cause would be "intolerable and unreasonable." 40 Such
suspicionless searches would infringe upon a citizen's "right to free passage
without interruption or search unless there is known to a competent official,
cause for believing that their vehicles are
authorized to search, 4probable
1
carrying contraband."
Individualized suspicion limits the government's discretion to intrude
42
upon the privacy interests safeguarded by the Fourth Amendment.
Officers may only initiate a search or seizure when objective circumstances
give rise to suspicion that the search or seizure will uncover evidence of
wrongdoing. 4 3 This not only curtails the threat that officials may arbitrarily
single out an individual, but also allows individuals to avoid government
interference by refraining from suspicious behavior. 44 Although the Fourth
Amendment's text does not expressly make individualized suspicion a
prerequisite for a reasonable search or seizure, some commentators assert
that the Warrant Clause's insistence on probable cause makes
individualized suspicion an "inherent quality of reasonable searches and
seizures," 4 5 even in situations where no warrant is required.
Under a "representation reinforcement" theory of the Fourth
Amendment, some commentators have argued that searches and seizures
lacking individualized suspicion are relatively unproblematic if conducted
against the general public using procedures that restrain the discretion of

37. See id. (stating that subjecting highway automobile searches to the warrant
requirement would be too impractical because the motorist might drive away before a
warrant could be issued).
38. Id. at 149.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 153-54.
41. Id. at 154. The U.S. Supreme Court made an exception for searches at international
borders. Id.
42. Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the
Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. Mem. L. Rev. 483, 485 (1995).

43. Clancy, supra note 12, at 996-97.
44. See id.at 996.
45. Clancy, supra note 42, at 489; see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S.
646, 670 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that the Warrant Clause's requirement of
objective probable cause to prevent abuses of general warrants implies the framers' disdain
for all suspicionless searches and seizures).
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officers in selecting whom to search. 4 6 The premise of this theory is that
judicial review should not be used to displace the substantive values of the
majority, 47 but only to repair defects in the political process, such as
discrimination against "discrete and insular minorities" preventing them
from using the political process to further their interests. 48 Accordingly, the
Fourth Amendment is primarily concerned that officials will undervalue the
privacy interests of political minorities by targeting them for arbitrary
intrusions based upon illegitimate criteria such as race or class. 4 9 By
ordinarily requiring a warrant and probable cause, the Fourth Amendment
ensures that a search or seizure will be based upon objective and legitimate
criteria and will accord equal weight to the privacy interests of each
citizen. 50 Suspicionless searches and seizures visited upon the general
public without any discretion spread the privacy costs more widely and
avoid the danger that political minorities will be impermissibly targeted. If
the majority found such a search program unreasonable, nothing would
prevent it from repealing the program through the political process. 5 1
4. The Balancing Test and Its Effect on Individualized Suspicion
a. Camara v. Municipal Court
The Court vacillated between a general reasonableness standard and the
warrant preference rule throughout the twentieth century, but by the late
1960s the latter seemed to reign supreme. 52 In 1968, however, the Court in

46. See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 96-97 (1980); Silas J. Wasserstrom &
Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 Geo. L.J. 19,
92-103 (1988) (discussing representation reinforcement theory).
47. Cf Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 92 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The
Constitution does not resolve all difficult social questions, but leaves the vast majority of

them to resolution by debate and the democratic process-which would produce a decision
by citizens ... through their elected representatives, to forbid or permit [a particular] police
action ... ").
48. Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 46, at 92-93.
49. Id.; see also Ely, supra note 46, at 97 ("[T]he Fourth Amendment can be seen as
another harbinger of the Equal Protection Clause, concerned with avoiding indefensible
inequities in treatment."). But see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (stating that the "greatest dangers" to the liberty protected by the
Fourth Amendment "lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but
without understanding").
50. Ely, supra note 46, at 172-73.
51. See William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth
Amendment, 44 Stan. L. Rev 553, 588 (1992) ("The likeliest explanation for giving greater
leeway to group stops is that politics provides an adequate remedy for overzealous police
action; groups of drivers, unlike the solitary suspect, can protect themselves from
overzealous police tactics at the polls.").
52. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("For
some years... our jurisprudence lurched back and forth between imposing a categorical
warrant requirement and looking to reasonableness alone.... By the late 1960's, the
preference for a warrant had won out, at least rhetorically." (citations omitted)); see also

2006]

SUBWAY SEARCHES

3239

Camara v. Municipal Court53 imported a reasonableness balancing test into
Fourth Amendment analysis that has since offered a competing model to the
traditional warrant and probable cause requirements. Instead of assessing a
search's reasonableness by determining if there is probable cause, the Court
in Camara couched probable cause itself within a reasonableness
standard. 54 Overruling a decision that had permitted warrantless housing
inspections, 55 the Court declined to excuse from the warrant requirement a
municipality's program of inspecting homes for compliance with housing
regulations. A warrant was required because adherence to the warrant
procedure would not frustrate the ends of the search program. 56 Yet the
Court rejected the argument that warrants permitting such inspections could
only issue upon probable cause that a particular house contained safety
violations. 57 Instead, the court redefined 58 probable cause as the "standard
by which a particular decision to search is tested against the constitutional
mandate of reasonableness." 59 The determination of whether a search
meets this reasonableness standard entails balancing the government
60
interests against the intrusion upon privacy interests.
The Court drew a distinction between what is considered a reasonable
search in a criminal investigation, which "would hardly justify a sweeping
search of an entire city," and the housing inspections, which seek "to
prevent even the unintentional development of conditions which are
hazardous to public health and safety."' 6 1 Camarafound three factors to be
persuasive of the area inspection program's reasonableness: a long history
of judicial and public acceptance for housing inspections; the necessity of
detecting non-obvious but dangerous conditions combined with the
unlikelihood that techniques other than the area-wide searches could
"achieve acceptable results;" and the limited intrusiveness of a search that is
"neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of
crime." 62 Deeming the inspection program reasonable, the Court found it
"obvious" that probable cause existed, as long as "reasonable legislative or
administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with

Scott E. Sundby, A Return to FourthAmendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara

and Terry, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 383, 386-87 (1988).
53. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
54. See Sundby, supra note 52, at 394.
55. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S 360 (1959).
56. Camara,387 U.S. at 533.

57. Id. at 538-39.
58. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 877 n.4 (1987) ("In the administrative
search context, we formally require that administrative warrants be supported by 'probable
cause,' because in that context we use that term as referring not to a quantum of evidence,
but merely to a requirement of reasonableness. In other contexts, however, we use 'probable
cause' to refer to a quantum of evidence for the belief justifying the search, to be
distinguished from a lesser quantum such as 'reasonable suspicion."' (citations omitted)).
59. Camara,387 U.S. at 534.
60. Id. at 534-35.
61. Id. at 535.
62. Id. at 537.
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respect to a particular dwelling." 63 These standards would consider the
general conditions of the neighborhood, the length of time between
inspections, and the type of dwellings to be inspected. However, the
standards do "not necessarily depend upon specific knowledge of the
64
condition of the particular dwelling."
b. Terry v. Ohio
One year after deciding Camara,the Court in Terry v. Ohio6 5 employed a
balancing test to determine the level of suspicion required to justify an
officer's brief detention and frisk of a suspect. Unlike Camara,no warrant
was required to authorize this intrusion. The Court determined the "stopand-frisk" to be a limited seizure and search 66 that had not historically been,
and could not practically be, subjected to the warrant requirement because it
necessitates immediate police action. 67 Because the warrant requirement
did not apply to the police conduct in question, the Court found it
unnecessary to ascertain whether probable cause existed to justify the
encounter. 68 Instead, "the Fourth Amendment's general proscription
against unreasonable searches and seizures" provided the test for the
validity of the stop and frisk. 69 Citing Camara,the Court stated that there
is "no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the
need to search (or seize) against the invasion which the search (or seizure)
70
entails."
Although Terry deemed the stop and frisk reasonable despite the absence
of probable cause, the existence of individualized suspicion played a central
role in Terry's reasonableness analysis:

63. Id. at 538. Responding to the concern that this standard for probable cause permitted
a "synthetic search warrant" that diluted the Fourth Amendment's protections, the Court
stated:
The warrant procedure is designed to guarantee that a decision to search private
property is justified by a reasonable governmental interest. But reasonableness is
still the ultimate standard. If a valid public interest justifies the intrusion
contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search
warrant. Such an approach neither endangers time-honored doctrines applicable to
criminal investigations nor makes a nullity of the probable cause requirement in
this area. It merely gives full recognition to the competing public and private
interests here at stake and, in so doing, best fulfills the historic purpose behind the
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable government invasions of privacy.
Id. at 539 (internal citations omitted).
64. Id. at 538.
65. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
66. Id. at 16-19.
67. Id. at 20.
68. Id.
69. Id.; see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 704-06 (1983) (holding that
reasonable suspicion, a lesser quantum of individualized suspicion than probable cause,
suffices to validate a temporary seizure of luggage that is minimally intrusive on privacy
interests and justified by a substantial government interest).
70. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
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In order to assess the reasonableness of [police] conduct as a general
proposition, it is necessary first to focus upon the governmental interest
which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally
protected interests of the private citizen .... And in justifying the
particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those
71
facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.
The detention and frisk must be justified by objective facts that would cause
a reasonable person to believe that the suspect might be armed and pose a
danger to the officer or others. 72 The rationale underlying this requirement
parallels that of the warrant requirement:
It ensures that a neutral
magistrate can review the reasonableness of the officer's decision to search,
albeit ex post. 73 It thereby limits the officer's discretion and avoids
74
intrusions "based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches."
Although Terry struck the constitutional balance at reasonable suspicion,
Camara and the cases discussed below demonstrate that the balancing test
75
contains no built-in requirement of individualized suspicion.
B. Suspicionless Searches andSeizures
The traditional warrant preference rule makes individualized suspicion a
prerequisite to a lawful government search. Camaraexpanded the scope of
the Fourth Amendment by bringing housing inspections within its
regulation, but in so doing the case redefined probable cause as a
reasonableness standard allowing inspection to proceed without any
individualized suspicion that violations exist. 76 Terry deemed the probable
cause requirement inapplicable to a search not subject to the warrant
requirement, and balanced the competing government and privacy interests
to determine that frisks may proceed upon a lesser quantum of
individualized suspicion. 77
The remainder of Part I is devoted to
suspicionless searches and seizures. Part I.B will discuss exceptions to the
warrant and probable cause requirements which permit searches and
seizures without any individualized suspicion at all, describing the Supreme
71. Id.at 20-21 (citations omitted).
72. See id. at 21.

73. Id.("The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is
assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be
subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the
reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances.").
74. Id.at 22.
75. See Wasserstrom, supra note 27, at 127 ("[Terry] paved the way for a more
conservative court that assigns greater weight to governmental interests to invoke Terry not
only to strike the balance in a way that gives the police enlarged authority to stop and frisk
on reasonable suspicion, but also to use a balancing approach to justify even full scale
searches and seizures without a warrant, probable cause, or even individualized suspicion,
where the governmental need is determined to be especially acute.").
76. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533, 538-39 (1967). See generally 5 LaFave,
supranote 7, § 10.1.
77. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21.
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Court precedents which define these exceptions. Part LC will focus on the
lower courts' and Supreme Court's treatment of airport searches, which are
highly analogous to mass transit searches to prevent terrorism. Part I.D
will introduce the suspicionless subway search programs implemented in
New York in July of 2005 and in Boston in July of 2004.
1. Early Suspicionless Searches and Seizures
a. Border Searches
Prior to Camara, suspicionless searches and seizures were permitted in
only two contexts: searches and seizures occurring at the United States's
borders and consensual searches. The Court has found the Fourth
Amendment inapplicable to border searches, 7 8 in part because the First
Congress, which proposed the Amendment, also passed a customs act
authorizing the warrantless search of goods entering the country. 79 Dictum
in the 1925 case of Carroll v. United States distinguished searches of
motorists lawfully in the country, which must be based on probable cause,
from searches of persons entering the country, which do not require
probable cause. 80 In the 1970s, the Court relied on this language to hold

78. Note, Border Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 77 Yale L.J. 1007, 1007-08
(1968).
79. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886); see also United States v. Ramsey,
431 U.S. 606, 616-19 (1977) (discussing Boyd, 116 U.S. 616). In Boyd, the Court
interpreted the fact that the same Congress which proposed the Fourth Amendment also
passed the Collection Act of 1789, authorizing officials to search for and seize goods to
mean "that the members of that body did not regard searches and seizures of this kind as
'unreasonable,' and [these searches and seizures] are not embraced within the prohibition of
the amendment." Boyd, 116 U.S. at 623. However, it is not entirely clear that the Collection
Act discussed in Boyd contemplated suspicionless searches. The Act reads as follows:
Sec. 23 And Be it Further Enacted, That it shall be lawful for the collector, or
other officer of the customs, after entry made of any goods, wares or merchandise,
on suspicion of fraud, to open and examine, in the presence of two or more
reputable merchants, any package or packages thereof....
Sec. 24 And Be it Further Enacted, That every collector, naval officer and
surveyor, or other person specially appointed by either of them for that purpose,
shall have full power and authority, to enter any ship or vessel, in which they shall
have reason to suspect any goods, wares or merchandise subject to duty shall be
concealed; and therein to search for, seize, and secure any such goods, wares or
merchandise; and if they shall have cause to suspect a concealment thereof, in any
particular dwelling-house, store, building, or other place, they or either of them
shall, upon application on oath or affirmation to any justice of the peace, be
entitled to a warrant to enter such house, store, or other place (in the day time only)
and there to search for such goods, and if any shall be found, to seize and secure
the same for trial ....

Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29, 43 (1789) (repealed 1790); see also Vemonia Sch.
Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 671 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that the
Collection Act of 1789 required suspicion before search).
80. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925) ("Travelers may be [stopped
without probable cause] in crossing an international boundary because of national self
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that searches of persons entering the country "are reasonable simply by
virtue of the fact that they occur at the border." 8 1 This inherent
reasonableness derives from the government's sovereign right of selfprotection. 82 Therefore, the Fourth Amendment
permits border searches
83
without any suspicion of the targeted individual.
b. ConsensualSearches

Consensual searches are also valid regardless of whether there is
individualized suspicion. 84 As the Supreme Court has recently explained in
United States v. Drayton, "Even when law enforcement officers have no
basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may ...request consent to
search luggage-provided they do not induce cooperation by coercive
means." 85 The Court has analyzed searches of passengers at airports 86 and
on buses 87 as consent searches. 88 The Court's analysis in these cases
follows a two-part inquiry. First, the Court determines whether law
enforcement has illegally seized the individual, in which case "any consent
to [a] search [is] plainly invalid as a product of the illegal seizure." 89 If no
seizure has occurred or if the individual is legally seized, then the Court
evaluates whether the consent to search was voluntarily given.
In determining whether the search is voluntary, the Court "examin[es] all
the surrounding circumstances to determine if in fact the consent to search
was coerced." 90 Early cases considered consent subjectively and asked
whether the individual actually consented to the search voluntarily. 9 1
protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to
come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in.").
81. Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616.
82. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 154.
83. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985) ("Routine
searches of the persons and effects of entrants are not subject to any requirement of
reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or warrant.").
84. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
85. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002).
86. Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1 (1984); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
87. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194; Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
88. These searches, each of which involved police singling out individuals for search,
differ from the general searches of all passengers seeking to use mass transit. See infra Part
I.C-D.
89. Drayton, 536 U.S. at 208-09 (Souter, J., dissenting). A seizure occurs when a
"reasonable person would [not] feel free to terminate the encounter [with the officers]." Id. at
201 (majority opinion). However, no seizure occurs when a police officer simply
approaches an individual and asks questions, requests identification, or requests permission
to search the individual. Id. at 200-01. A seizure may be lawful, even if it is based upon a
level of suspicion short of probable cause, so long as it is an "investigative detention," it lasts
no longer than necessary, and it uses the least intrusive means to confirm or dispel the
officer's suspicion. Royer, 460 U.S. at 500.
90. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 229 (1973).
91. See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558-59 (1980); United States
v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424 (1976); see also Ric Simmons, Not "Voluntary" but Still
Reasonable: A New Paradigmfor Understanding the Consent Searches Doctrine, 80 Ind.
L.J. 773, 779-81 (2005).
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However, more recent cases focus on the objective inquiry of whether a
"reasonable person would ...feel free to decline the officers' requests [to
'9 2
search] or otherwise terminate the encounter.
Drayton provides a recent illustration of the Court's highly fact-driven
voluntariness analysis for consent searches. Making a scheduled stop at a
refueling station during a bus trip from Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, to Detroit,
Michigan, a bus driver permitted three plainclothes officers from the
Tallahassee police department to board the bus. 9 3 One officer remained at
the front of the bus but did not block the exit. 94 The other two officers
walked to the back of the bus and then, moving towards the front,
questioned each of the passengers and matched them up with luggage in the
overhead rack. 95 One officer later testified that anyone who refused to
96
cooperate or wished to leave the bus would have been permitted to do so.
He further testified that, during previous bus interdiction efforts, he had
informed passengers of their right to refuse cooperation, but did not do so
on this occasion. 97 The officer reached the row in which Christopher
Drayton and his companion, Clifton Brown, Jr., were seated. 98 Speaking in
a low voice, the officer informed the men that they were conducting drug
interdiction searches and requested and received permission from the men
to search their sole piece of luggage, a green duffel bag. 9 9 After confirming
that the bag contained no contraband, the officer noticed that the men were
wearing baggy clothing inappropriate for the warm weather.' 0 0 The officer
asked and received from Brown permission to conduct a pat-down search,
which revealed nearly half a kilogram of cocaine taped to Brown's legs
underneath his pants. 1 1 After arresting the companion, the officer
requested and received permission to frisk Drayton, which also revealed
102
possession of cocaine.
The Court found that Drayton's consent to the search was voluntarily
given. The fact that the officer asked permission to frisk would indicate to
a reasonable person that he was free to refuse it. 10 3 While expressly
informing an individual of his freedom to withhold consent is a factor

92. Drayton, 536 U.S. at 202; see Simmons, supra note 91, at 781-84. Thus, the test for
determining whether a seizure has occurred and whether a search is voluntary "turn[s] on
very similar facts." Drayton, 536 U.S. at 206 (internal quotation omitted); Simmons, supra

note 91, at 782 ("[l]n practice, the voluntariness test for consent has become so inextricably
linked to the objective Fourth Amendment test for seizure that it is unlikely that the
subjective elements will ever be reaffirmed by the courts.").
93. Drayton, 536 U.S. at 197.
94. Id.at 197-98.
95. Id. at 198.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.at 198-99.
100. Id. at 199.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.at 206.
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bearing on the voluntariness of a search, such notice is not "the sine qua
non of an effective consent."10 4 Under the totality of the circumstancesthe fact that there was "no application of force, no intimidating movement,
no overwhelming show of force, no brandishing of weapons, no blocking of
15
exits, no threat, no command, not even an authoritative tone of voice"' 06
the Court could draw no inference of coercion that would vitiate consent.'
2. Suspicionless Searches and Seizures Recognized After Camara
In the years following Camara, the Court developed new doctrines that
permit other types of suspicionless searches and seizures. Individualized
suspicion proves problematic when the government seeks to protect the
public from a harm not ordinarily foreshadowed by observable suspicious
activity. In 1976, the Court expressly recognized that, while "some
quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a
constitutional search or seizure, .... the Fourth Amendment imposes no
irreducible requirement of such suspicion."' 1 7 Subsequent cases have
confirmed that "a showing of individualized suspicion is not a
constitutional floor, below which a search must be presumed
unreasonable."' 1 8 In three contexts-administrative inspections, roadblock
checkpoint seizures, and "special needs" searches-the Court has permitted
departure from the warrant and probable cause requirements and has upheld
suspicionless searches and seizures. 109
a. Administrative Searches
The administrative search doctrine permits warrantless inspections of
business premises and activities in highly regulated industries without any
suspicion that a regulatory violation exists. In Colonnade CateringCorp. v.
United States,110 the Court held that Congress had the power to authorize
IRS officials to inspect the business premises of federally licensed liquor
distributors upon demand and without a warrant.1 11 On the grounds that
there was a "long history of the regulation of the liquor industry during preFourth Amendment days," the Court found the framework of the warrant
procedure inapplicable to statutory liquor-licensing programs that required

104. Id. at 206-07.
105. Id. at 204.
106. Id. at 207.
107. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-61 (1976).
108. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989).
109. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37-38 (2000).
110. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
111. Id. at 76-77. The Court found that Congress did not exercise this power but instead
imposed a fine on licensees who refused to allow entry. Id. at 77. Thus, the Court concluded
that the official's forcible entry was unauthorized by Congress without reaching the Fourth
Amendment question. Id.; see also 5 LaFave, supra note 7, § 10.2(a), at 41.
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inspections. 112 Rather, the validity of such programs would be "resolved on
a case-by-case basis under the general Fourth Amendment standard of
113
reasonableness.",
In United States v. Biswell, the Court permitted a warrantless inspection,
authorized by federal statute, of a federally licensed gun dealer's
pawnshop.11 4 Although regulation of interstate firearms trafficking was not
as "deeply rooted in history" as regulation of the liquor industry, the Court
permitted the search because obtaining a warrant might "easily frustrate
inspection" and because a dealer who decides to "engage in this pervasively
regulated business... does so with the knowledge that his business records,
1 15
firearms, and ammunition will be subject to effective inspection."
Therefore, the Court concluded that, where "regulatory inspections further
urgent federal interest[s], and the possibilities of abuse and the threat to
privacy are not of impressive dimensions," warrantless inspections could
proceed. 116
A 1987 case, New York v. Burger, summarized the "Colonnade-Biswell
doctrine" as standing for "the reduced expectation of privacy by an owner
of commercial premises in a 'closely regulated' industry" because of
pervasive and regular regulation."1 7 The Court there upheld a state statute
authorizing police to search automobile junkyards for evidence of
possession of stolen property. 1 8 Significantly, the Court held that searches
by police pursuant to an administrative scheme governing the operation of
an industry are not rendered illegal simply by the fact that the searches are
also intended to facilitate enforcement of the penal law. 119
If the business has not been subject to such pervasive regulation that its
proprietor relinquishes her reasonable expectation of privacy, a warrant is
required. 120 Yet the warrant may be issued without "probable cause 12to1
believe that conditions in violation of [the law] exist on the premises."'
Later cases have reaffirmed Camara's holding that probable cause is
established so long as "reasonable legislative or administrative standards for
conducting an . . . inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular

establishment."' 22 Thus, suspicionless inspections of non-heavily regulated
businesses are permissible, but only if authorized by a warrant.

112. Colonnade Catering Corp., 397 U.S. at 75. This history of regulation distinguished
the case from See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967), in which the Court had held

that "administrative entry, without consent, upon the portions of commercial premises which
are not open to the public may only be compelled through prosecution or physical force
within the framework of a warrant procedure."
113. Colonnade CateringCorp., 397 U.S. at 77.
114. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311,316-17 (1972).
115. Id. at 315,316.
116. Id. at 317.
117. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 701 (1987).
118. Id. at 694, 716-17.
119. Id. at 712-13.
120. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313-20 (1978)
121. Id. at 320.
122. Id. (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967)).
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b. Roadblock Checkpoints
The roadblock checkpoint exception allows law enforcement officials to
temporarily detain motorists at roadside checkpoints without warrant or
suspicion of any wrongdoing. The checkpoints must be carried out
pursuant to neutral criteria that limit the discretion of officials in the field in
selecting whom to stop. 123 The checkpoints must also be primarily
intended to serve an interest distinct from the "general interest in crime
control."' 124 Because these seizures are less intrusive than a traditional
arrest, the Fourth Amendment does not demand satisfaction of the warrant
procedure's requirements. Rather, courts will uphold the checkpoint
seizure if it is reasonable. A determination of reasonableness here
"involves a weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the
seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the
125
severity of the interference with individual liberty."'
This exception was first recognized in the 1976 case of United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte.126 The Court upheld the U.S. Border Patrol's use of
permanent checkpoint stops on highways near the U.S.-Mexican border to
detain motorists for brief questioning without warrant or individualized
suspicion. 127 Relying on Terry, the Court weighed the public interest
served by the checkpoints against the privacy interest of motorists in order
to "delineat[e] the constitutional safeguards applicable in particular
contexts" and determined that no individualized suspicion was required for
the checkpoint stops. 128 It would be too impractical to require officials to
form suspicion that occupants of any car had entered the country illegally
before initiating a search because "the flow of traffic tends to be too heavy
to allow the particularized study of a given car that would enable it to be
identified as a possible carrier of illegal aliens" and "would largely
eliminate any deterrent to the conduct of well-disguised smuggling
operations."' 12 9 The Court also found the warrant requirement inapplicable,
distinguishing Camara on the basis that, unlike the brief detention of
130
motorists, the search of homes traditionally required a warrant.
After excusing the warrant and individualized suspicion requirements,
the Court conducted a balancing test to assess the reasonableness of the

123. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979).
124. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000).
125. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979); see also Mich. Dep't of State Police v.
Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990) (stating that the Brown v. Texas balancing test applies to
checkpoint seizures).
126. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
127. Id. at 562.
128. Id. at 555; see also 5 LaFave, supra note 7, § 10.8(d), at 360 ("The teaching of
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte... is that the constitutionality of a roadblock must be
determined by application of the Camarabalancing test.").
129. Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 557.
130. Id. at 565.
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checkpoint program. 13 1 The Court distinguished the program from the one
that it had invalidated the previous year 32 because the checkpoints there at
issue authorized officials not only to stop motorists for questioning but also
to search their automobiles. 133 Noting that individuals had a diminished
expectation of privacy in their automobiles and that the Court was
"deal[ing] neither with searches nor with the sanctity of private dwellings,
ordinarily afforded the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection," the
134
Court concluded that the checkpoint stops were reasonable.
In one case, Delaware v. Prouse, the Court seemed to demand that a
suspicionless police stop must attain a minimum level of effectiveness, or
even be more effective than an alternative suspicion-based technique, in
order to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 135 The Court struck
down the use of roving police patrols to stop motorists for the purpose of
checking compliance with licensing and registration regulations, deeming
the procedure unreasonable absent reasonable suspicion.' 36 The Court
found that the intrusions upon privacy interests outweighed the government
interest, particularly in light of the stop's ineffectiveness in furthering the
detection of violations. 137 However, the Court reserved determination of
131. The Court determined that the stops were necessary to curtail illegal immigration
and substantially furthered this government interest. Id. at 556-57. The Court then assessed
the intrusion upon a motorist's privacy interest and determined it to be "quite limited." Id. at
557-58. The Court found the checkpoints less intrusive than the suspicionless roving patrol
stops that it had previously struck down "because the subjective intrusion-the generating of
concern or even fright on the part of lawful travelers-is appreciably less in the case of a
checkpoint stop." Id. at 558 (discussing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873
(1975)). In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, the Court struck down suspicionless roving
patrol stops near the border because "the nature of illegal alien traffic and the characteristics
of smuggling operations tend to generate articulable grounds for identifying violators."
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 883. Thus, "a requirement of reasonable suspicion for stops
allows the Government adequate means of guarding the public interest and also protects
residents of the border areas from indiscriminate official interference." Id. The Court in
Martinez-Fuertefurther found the routine checkpoint stops reasonable because they granted
officials in the field minimal discretion, in determining both the location of the checkpoint
and which motorists to seize. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559; see also 5 LaFave, supra
note 7, § 10.8(d), at 367.
132. See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896-97 (1975) (holding that "[a] search,
even of an automobile, is a substantial invasion of privacy" and therefore requires probable
cause because accepting a lesser quantum of suspicion would grant officials a "degree of
discretion... not consistent with the Fourth Amendment").
133. Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 558.
134. Id. at 561.
135. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659-62 (1979).
136. Id. at 663.
137. Id. at 654-63. The Court recognized that Delaware had a "vital interest" in enforcing
state licensing and registration requirements and thereby maintaining highway safety. Id. at
658. Nonetheless, it struck down the state's use of roving patrols to conduct random spot
checks of motorists because this practice was not a "sufficiently productive mechanism to
justify the intrusion upon Fourth Amendment interests." Id. at 659. The Court assumed that,
absent data showing otherwise, the police were more likely to detect vehicle regulation
violations through the traditional method of enforcement-vehicle stops after police
observation of traffic violations-than by "choosing randomly from the entire universe of
drivers." Id. Likewise, the Court found it inconceivable that an unlicensed driver, undeterred
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whether the "[q]uestioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops"
would be permissible, because such stops are less
intrusive and limit the
38
potential for officers to use arbitrary discretion.1
Although the Court struck down the suspicionless patrol stop, Prouse's
discussion of the Fourth Amendment indicated a much broader application
of the balancing test. The Court declared that "[t]he essential purpose of the
proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard of
'reasonableness' upon the exercise of discretion by government
officials." 139 The Court then suggested that the balancing test is the rule for
determining reasonableness, rather than an exception to the warrant
preference rule that applies in specific circumstances. 140 Furthermore, the
Court stated that the balancing test determines whether the search must be
predicated upon probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or whether "the
balance of interests precludes
insistence upon some quantum of
14 1
individualized suspicion.'
Any implication created by Prouse that the Court would engage in a
"searching examination" of a suspicionless checkpoint stop's effectiveness
in assessing its reasonableness was put to rest in Michigan Department of
State Police v. Sitz. 142 The Court repudiated the lower court's finding that
suspicionless seizures of motorists at roadblock sobriety checkpoints were
not sufficiently effective to be constitutional. 14 3 The Court then applied the
balancing test and permitted the sobriety checkpoints. Citing statistics of
the number of causalities and amount of property damage caused annually
by the prospect of some incident or accident requiring him to prove his qualification to drive
would be deterred by a random spot check. Id. at 660. Therefore the Court concluded that
the practice's "incremental contribution to highway safety" was "marginal at best" and did
not justify departure from the Fourth Amendment's usual requirement of individualized
suspicion. Id. at 659-60. The Court held that roving patrols could only stop motorists to
enforce licensing vehicle regulations upon "articulable and reasonable suspicion" that the
driver is unlicensed or that the automobile is unregistered. Id at 663.
138. Id. at 663. Justice Blackmun wrote in concurrence to emphasize that the Court's
reservation "also includes other not purely random stops (such as every 10th car to pass a
given point) that equate with, but are less intrusive than, a 100% roadblock stop." Id at 664
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
139. Id. at 653-54.
140. Id. at 654. The Court stated that "the permissibility of a particular law enforcement
practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests
against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Id. Later in the opinion, a
footnote added that the warrant clause "generally requires that prior to a search a neutral and
detached magistrate ascertain that the requisite standard is met." Id. at 654 n. 11. However
the Court excused the roving patrol stops from the warrant requirement by analogizing them
to the street encounters in Terry, which required no warrant. Id. at 655-56.
141. Id. at 654-55 (internal quotation omitted).
142. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 454-55 (1990).
143. Id. at 453-54. The Court stated that the inquiry into the degree to which a program
furthers the governmental interest is "not meant to transfer from politically accountable
officials to the courts the decision as to which among reasonable alternative law enforcement
techniques should be employed to deal with a serious public danger." Id. at 453. The Court
pointed to evidence that 1.6% of motorists stopped were arrested for drunk driving as proof
that the program was sufficiently effective and distinguished Prouse on the grounds that no
empirical evidence of effectiveness had been offered in that case. Id. at 454-55.
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by drunk driving, the Court found the states' interest in eradicating drunk
driving as beyond dispute. 144 In terms of the level of intrusion upon
motorists' privacy interests, the checkpoints were indistinguishable from
the minimal intrusion caused by the checkpoints in Martinez-Fuerte.145
The Court concluded that "the balance of the State's interest in preventing
drunken driving, the extent to which this system can reasonably be said to
advance that interest, and the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists
who are briefly stopped" favored the use of the sobriety checkpoints. 146
The Court has recently imposed a threshold rule that, in order to be
reasonable, suspicionless checkpoints must have a primary purpose distinct
from ordinary law enforcement. 147 In the 2000 case of City of Indianapolis
v. Edmond, the Court struck down a roadblock checkpoint program
designed primarily for narcotics interdiction. 148 The Court distinguished
Indianapolis's program from other permissible checkpoints on the grounds
that the "primary purpose" of those approved programs addressed the
problems of policing the border and maintaining highway safety, not
"uncover[ing] evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.' ' 149 Even though
securing the border and apprehending drunk drivers are law enforcement
activities that might lead to arrests and criminal prosecutions, allowing
checkpoints erected for a mere "general interest in crime control" would
make suspicionless seizures "a routine part of American life." 150
The Court's discussion of the Fourth Amendment in Edmond is
interesting in two respects. First, the Court did not even mention the
warrant preference rule. Rather, the Court began its discussion by stating
that "[t]he Fourth Amendment requires that searches and seizures be
reasonable."' 15 1
Second, the analysis elevated the importance of
individualized suspicion. The Court declared that it has condoned departure
from the norm of individualized suspicion in only three "limited
circumstances": searches that serve "special needs"; searches conducted for
"administrative purposes"; and seizures of motorists at highway
checkpoints to intercept illegal aliens, prevent drunk driving, and to detect
violation of vehicle operation regulations. 152
In its most recent checkpoint decision, Illinois v. Lidster,153 the Court
upheld the stopping of motorists by police seeking information about a hitand-run accident that had occurred on the same road one week earlier.' 54
During the course of complying with the stop, Robert S. Lidster exhibited
144. Id. at 451.

145. Id.at 451-53.
146. Id. at 455.
147. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
148. Id.

149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 42.
Id.at 41-42.
Id.at37.
Id.at 37-38.

153. 540 U.S. 419 (2004).

154. Id.at422.
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signs of intoxication and was arrested for drunk driving. 155 Overruling the
state court decision that the checkpoint seizure violated the Fourth
Amendment because its primary purpose was to investigate a crime, the
Court distinguished Edmond on the grounds that Illinois's checkpoint was
not intended to discover evidence that the seized motorists had committed a
crime. 156 Rather, the stop sought to elicit information that would lead to the
apprehension of others. 157 Finding Edmond's threshold rule against
checkpoints with a general interest in crime control not implicated, the
Court applied the balancing
test and found the information-seeking
58
checkpoint to be reasonable.1
c. The Special Needs Doctrine
The special needs doctrine applies to "certain regimes of suspicionless
searches where the program was designed to serve special needs, beyond
the normal need for law enforcement."' 159 Once a court identifies a
government interest as a special need, the warrant, probable cause and
individualized suspicion requirements no longer apply, and the validity of
the search hangs in the balance of government and privacy interests. By its
terms, the doctrine suggests applicability to a range of interests as broad as
one can define "special." Yet, in recent years, the Supreme Court has
predominantly invoked this doctrine to test the validity of suspicionless
0
drug testing.' 6
The term "special needs" comes from Justice Harry Blackmun's
concurrence in the 1985 case of New Jersey v. TL.O., in which he stated
that "[o]nly in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs,
beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and
probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its
balancing of interests for that of the Framers." '16 1 In TL.O., a school
official searched a student's purse expecting to find cigarettes and found
evidence that the girl was dealing marijuana. The majority did not adopt
Justice Blackmun's standard to analyze the validity of the search. Rather,
the Court declared that the Fourth Amendment's "underlying command" is
reasonableness and cited Camara for the proposition that "[t]he
determination of the standard of reasonableness governing any specific

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id.at 423-24.
Id. at 423.
Id.at 423-28.
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000).
Tracey Maclin, Is Obtaining an Arrestee's DNA a Valid Special Needs Search
Under the Fourth Amendment? What Should (and Will) the Supreme Court Do?, 33 J.L.
Med. & Ethics 102, 108-09 (2005).
161. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 74 n.7 (2001); Maclin, supra note 160, at 108.
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class of searches requires balancing the need to search against the invasion
162
which the search entails."'
The search in T.L.O. was not suspicionless. The search's reasonableness
rested on the existence of "reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search
[would] turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either
the law or the rules of the school." 163 The Court in T.L.O., citing MartinezFuerte, expressly declined to consider whether searches of students by
school officials required any individualized suspicion as an "essential
element" of reasonableness. 164
Justice Blackmun concurred in the
judgment because, although he agreed that maintaining discipline in the
public schools provided a special need justifying a search on a lesser
quantum of individualized suspicion than probable cause, he found
"troubling" the majority's "implication that the balancing test is the rule
165
rather than the exception."'
Justice Blackmun's term- "special needs" was officially adopted in
O'Connor v. Ortega, where the Court found that state hospital officials
could lawfully conduct a warrantless search of a physician-employee's
office and seize his effects. 166 The Court determined that government
employers had a special need in the efficient and effective operation of
governmental agencies. 167 The next case to invoke the special needs
exception, Griffin v. Wisconsin, upheld a statute authorizing probation
officers to conduct warrantless searches of probationers' living quarters
where there were reasonable grounds to believe that contraband would be
8
found.

16

All subsequent special needs cases have concerned drug testing of certain
groups without any suspicion of drug use. The 1989 case of Skinner v.
Railway Executives' Ass 'n upheld a program authorizing the random drug
testing of railroad employees involved in accidents or in violation of safety
rules. 169 The Court's analysis began by stating that "the permissibility of a
particular practice 'is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's
Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate
governmental interests."', 170 The Court justified departure from the Fourth
Amendment's traditional requirements by explaining that, when special
162. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337.
163. Id. at 342.
164. Id at 342 n.8.
165. Id. at 352 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
166. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720 (1987).
167. Id. at 724. Justice Blackmun dissented, reiterating his criticism from T.L.O. that the
majority proceeded to the balancing test without identifying a "special need" to dispense

with the warrant and probable cause requirements. Id. at 742 ("Although the plurality
mentions the 'special need' step, it turns immediately to a balancing test to formulate its
standard of reasonableness. This error is significant because, given the facts of this case, no
'special need' exists here to justify dispensing with the warrant and probable-cause
requirements.").
168. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875-76 (1987).
169. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
170. Id. at 619 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)).
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needs exist, the Court "ha[s] not hesitated to balance the governmental and
privacy interests to assess the practicality71 of the warrant and probable-cause
requirements in the particular context."
Only after justifying the absence of a warrant and probable cause did the
Skinner Court cite Martinez-Fuerte for the proposition that, although
ordinarily required, "a showing of individualized suspicion is not a
constitutional floor, below which a search must be presumed
unreasonable."' 172 The Court described the rule on suspicionless searches as
follows: "In limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated
by the search are minimal, and where an important governmental interest
furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of
individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence of
'173
[individualized] suspicion.
A companion case decided the same day, National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, upheld the random drug testing of federal customs
employees seeking promotion or transfer to positions involving drug
interdiction or the carrying of a firearm. 174 The Court cited MartinezFuerte and T.L.O. for the proposition that a warrant, probable cause, or any
suspicion at all is not "an indispensable component of reasonableness in
every circumstance." 175 Where a search or seizure serves special needs
"beyond the normal need for law enforcement," the Court balances the
competing interests "to determine whether it is impractical to require a
warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the particular
context."' 176 The Court deemed the warrant requirement impractical
because it would divert the U.S. Customs Service's resources away from its
17 7
mission of enforcing the customs laws and interdicting contraband.
Furthermore, requiring a warrant would not further the protection of privacy
interests: Because the Service does not make a discretionary determination
to search based on a judgment that certain conditions are present, there are
simply no special facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate."i 78 The Court
then dismissed the probable cause standard as "peculiarly related to
171. Id.The Court found that the regulation of railroad employees' conduct to prevent
drug- and alcohol-related railway accidents constituted a special need. The Court dispensed
with the warrant requirement because the standardized nature of the drug tests achieved the

warrant's dual purposes of limiting the scope of the intrusion and the discretion of officials;
thus a warrant would furnish no additional protection of privacy. Id.at 621-22. Also,
requiring judicial pre-authorization would "impede the achievement of the Government's

objective" because physical evidence of an employee's impairment might be lost in the time
it would take to secure a warrant. Id.at 623-24. The Court also determined that it would be
unreasonable to expect the private railroads charged with administering the drug tests to
comply with the warrant procedure. Id.

172. Id. at 624.
173. Id.
174. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
175. id. at 665.
176. id. at 665-66.

177. Id. at 666-67.
178. Id. at 667.
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criminal investigations" and inapplicable to routine tests that seek to detect
violations that do not ordinarily generate grounds for suspicion. 179 The
Court found the government's need to conduct suspicionless testing to be
"sufficiently compelling" to dispense with a requirement of individualized
suspicion, 180 and the Court explained its balancing analysis to arrive at this
conclusion. 181
The Court has since determined that suspicionless drug testing of student
athletes 182 and student participants in extracurricular activities 183 constitutes
a special need that triggers the balancing test analysis. These cases
represent a significant departure from the decisions in Skinner and Von
Raab because it is much less clear that a drug testing regime based upon
some measure of individualized suspicion would be impractical in a school
setting, where all aspects of a student's behavior are subject to supervision
and control. 184 The majority in Vernonia School District v. Acton rejected
an individualized suspicion requirement because "accusatory drug
testing... transforms the process into a badge of shame," risks that
"troublesome but not drug-likely students" would be arbitrarily singled out,
and would burden school-teachers who are unqualified to detect signs of
drug use. 185 Surveying the checkpoint seizure and drug testing cases, the
dissent in Acton vigorously argued that the Court has "upheld the
suspicionless search only after first recognizing the Fourth Amendment's
longstanding preference for a suspicion-based search regime, and then
pointing to sound reasons why such a regime would likely be ineffectual
186
under the unusual circumstances presented."'
In two instances the Court has found that certain drug testing programs
do "not fit within the closely guarded category of constitutionally
permissible suspicionless searches."' 187 In Chandler v. Miller, the Court
held that Georgia's interest in drug testing candidates for state office was
not "sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth Amendment's normal
requirement of individualized suspicion"' 188 because there was no evidence
of drug use among state officials, 189 and the officials did not perform "high-

179. Id. at 667-68.

180. Id. at 668.
181. Id.at 667-79.
182. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995).
183. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 837 (2002).
184. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 678-81 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); 5 LaFave, supra note 7, §
10.1 (c), at 518-20.
185. Acton, 515 U.S. at 663; see also Earls, 536 U.S. at 837 (questioning "whether testing
based on individualized suspicion in fact would be less intrusive" because "[s]uch a regime
would place an additional burden on public school teachers who are already tasked with the
difficult job of maintaining order and discipline" and "might unfairly target members of
unpopular groups").
186. Acton, 515 U.S. at 674 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

187. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997).
188. Id. at318.
189. Id.at319.
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risk, safety-sensitive tasks."' 190 Furthermore, the drug tests could not be
effective because candidates could simply abstain from drugs before the
testing date, which was known in advance. 19 1 The Court concluded that
where "public safety is not genuinely in jeopardy, the Fourth Amendment
precludes the suspicionless search, no matter how conveniently
92
arranged."1
The Court in the 2001 case of Ferguson v. City of Charleston struck
down a state hospital's policy, developed in conjunction with law
enforcement, of testing pregnant women for drug use and reporting positive
test results to the police. 193 Although the city defended its policy on the
grounds that the drug tests furthered the special need of getting mothers into
treatment, the Court stated that the "immediate objective of the searches
was to generate evidence for law enforcement purposes."'194 The reporting
of results to police for the purpose of criminal prosecutions distinguished
the case from prior cases in which the Court had permitted suspicionless
drug testing.' 95
Professor Tracey Maclin has surveyed the special needs cases and has
isolated factors that the Court considers in deciding whether a special need
exists. 19 6 The most important factor is the purpose of the search-whether
it is intended to serve a need unrelated to law enforcement. 197 Ferguson
struck down the hospital's drug testing program because it was "ultimately
indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control": deterring drug
use through the threat of criminal prosecution. 198 A second factor that the
Court considers is whether law enforcement officials have access to the
information obtained from the search for use in criminal prosecutions. 199
The early cases, T.L.O. and Griffin, determined that a special need existed
despite the fact that the evidence discovered was handed over to law
enforcement to prosecute the student and the probationer. 200
But
subsequent cases have found law enforcement's lack of access to test results
to indicate that the tests were not conducted to further ordinary law
enforcement needs. 20 1 The Court in Ferguson emphasized this factor:
"The fact that positive test results were turned over to police does not
merely provide a basis for distinguishing our prior cases applying the
190. Id. at 321-22.
191. Id. at 319-20.
192. Id. at 323.
193. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
194. Id. at 83.
195. Id. As the Court explained, "Because law enforcement involvement always serves
some broader social purpose or objective, under respondents' view, virtually any
nonconsensual suspicionless search could be immunized under the special needs doctrine by
defining the search solely in terms of its ultimate, rather than immediate, purpose." Id. at 84.
196. Maclin, supra note 160, at 115.
197. Id. at 115-116.
198. Id. (quoting Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 81).
199. Id. at 116-117.
200. Id. at 116.
201. Id.
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'special needs' balancing approach ....
It also provides an affirmative
reason for enforcing the strictures of the Fourth Amendment. '20 2 Thus,
police access to the fruits of the search makes the search less likely to
qualify for special needs treatment.
A third factor, according to Professor Maclin, is whether law
enforcement is involved in conducting the search. 20 3 In Griffin, the fact that
police conducted the search of the probationer's home did not disqualify the
search from special needs treatment. 20 4 Concurring with the Court's
decision in Ferguson, however, Justice Kennedy stated that "[n]one of our
special needs precedents has sanctioned the routine inclusion of law
enforcement, both in the design of the policy and in using arrests, either
threatened or real, to implement the system designed for the special needs
objectives." 20 5 The drug testing program in Ferguson was invalidated
because its "primary and immediate purpose" was for criminal law
enforcement. 20 6 As Professor Maclin points out, it remains unsettled
whether a search conducted primarily for administrative purposes but with a
secondary purpose of discovering evidence for criminal prosecution could
20 7
qualify as a special needs search.
The relationship among administrative inspections, roadblock checkpoint
seizures, and the "special needs" searches is not settled. 20 8 Edmond
discusses these cases as distinct "limited circumstances" where
suspicionless searches may be reasonable. 20 9 The Court in Ferguson
distinguished special needs searches from checkpoint seizures and
administrative searches. 2 10 The opinion stated that special needs searches
must meet a higher standard because they do not merely involve brief
detentions (like checkpoints) or searches where the subject's expectation of
privacy is diminished by participating in a closely regulated industry (like
administrative searches). 21 1 However, the doctrines share a common
202.
203.
204.
205.

Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84; see Maclin, supra note 160, at 116.
Maclin, supra note 160, at 117.
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-75 (1987).
Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 88 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also id. at 84 (Stevens, J.)

(stating that the policy did not qualify as a special need because of "the extensive
involvement of law enforcement officials at every stage of the policy"); Maclin, supra note
160, at 117.
206. Maclin, supra note 160, at 117.
207. Id. at 117-118.
208. Compare City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 54 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) ("[Tihe 'perfectly plain' reason for not incorporating the 'special needs' test in
our roadblock seizure cases is that seizures of automobiles 'deal neither with searches nor
with the sanctity of private dwellings, ordinarily afforded the most stringent Fourth
Amendment protection."' (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561
(1976))), with Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987) (describing the
government's supervision of a regulated industry as a special need, "like its operation of a
school, government office or prison" and allowing departure from the warrant and probable
cause requirements).
209. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37-38.
210. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84.
211. Id. at 83 n.21 ("Accordingly, this case differs from New York v. Burger.... That
case involved an industry in which the expectation of privacy in commercial premises was

2006]

SUBWAY SEARCHES

3257

origin: The Court crafted each exception when it deemed the traditional
warrant and probable cause requirements as unnecessary prerequisites to
Fourth Amendment reasonableness in a specific 2 context,
and instead
12
applied the balancing analysis introduced in Camara.
C. Suspicionless Airport Searches
1. Lower Court Approval
Since the early 1970s, the lower courts have unanimously excused from
the warrant and probable cause requirements suspicionless airport searches
of passengers conducted to prevent air piracy. 2 13 When these courts first
considered airport screening procedures, the warrant preference rule
remained strong; these cases were decided before the implications of the
balancing test would manifest in the suspicionless checkpoint and special
needs cases. Some courts justified the airport search's departure from the
traditional Fourth Amendment requirements by folding the search into
recognized exceptions such as the administrative search or border search
doctrines. 2 14 Another found that the danger of air piracy alone justified the
absence of a warrant and probable cause, even though no recognized
exception applied. 2 15 The Supreme Court never granted certiorari to settle
particularly attenuated given the extent to which the industry in question was closely
regulated. More important for our purposes, the Court relied on the plain administrative
purposes of the scheme to reject the contention that the statute was in fact designed to gather
evidence to enable convictions under the penal laws .... This case also differs from the
handful of seizure cases in which we have applied a balancing test to determine Fourth
Amendment reasonableness. First, those cases involved roadblock seizures, rather than the
intrusive search of the body or the home. Second, the Court [has] explicitly distinguished
the cases dealing with checkpoints from those dealing with special needs." (citing New York
v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 701 (1987)); see also Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S.
444, 450 (1990) (distinguishing the standard for departing from individualized suspicion in
special needs searches from the standard for suspicionless checkpoint seizures).
212. But see Jennifer Y. Buffaloe, Note, "Special Needs " and the FourthAmendment: An
Exception Poised to Swallow the WarrantPreference Rule, 32 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 529,
536 (1997) (arguing that "[t]he special needs cases differ radically from the administrative
inspection cases" because "[w]hile the administrative cases involve essentially limited,
nonpersonal investigations, the special needs cases are full-fledged searches aimed at
discerning evidence of individual wrongdoing" and "none of the special needs searches
presents a situation where a search based on individualized suspicion is unworkable").
213. See, e.g., United States v. Fern, 484 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Doran, 482 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Miller, 480 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Legato, 480 F.2d
408 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Ruiz-Estrella, 481 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Echols, 477 F.2d 37 (8th Cir.
1973); United States v. Clark, 475 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Slocum, 464
F.2d 1180 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972); United States
v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1972).
214. See, e.g., Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (characterizing airport screening procedures as an
administrative search); Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1276 ("[T]he standards for initiating a search of
a person at the boarding gate should be no more stringent than those applied in border
crossing situations.").
215. United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d. 496 (2d Cir. 1974).
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this controversy. 2 16 As late as December 2003, one court admitted that "no
'2 17
consensus has been reached as to the grounds justifying such a search.
After an alarming increase in the incidence of skyjacking in the late
1960s, the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") in 1969 devised
screening procedures for airlines to implement to prevent the carrying of
weapons and explosives onboard. 2 18 Under this first set of procedures, only
passengers who fit a hijacker profile and who could not pass through a
metal detector without activating it were searched. 2 19 The searches
predictably led to thousands of arrests, mostly for crimes unrelated to
skyjacking, and to a flurry of Fourth Amendment challenges to suppress the
220
evidence obtained from the searches.
Initially, courts upheld these selective airport screening procedures under
the Terry doctrine. 22 1 One case illustrative of this analysis is United States
v. Bell.222 A ticket vendor at New York's La Guardia Airport found that
Henry Bell matched the FAA's hijacker profile and gave him a marked
ticket envelope designating his suspect status. 223 A federal marshal was
summoned to meet him at the boarding gate. 224 After passing through a
225
magnetometer, Bell triggered the alert, indicating the presence of metal.
Following another pass through and a second request for identification, Bell
stated that he had just been released from jail on bail for homicide and
narcotics charges. 226 The marshal requested and received consent to
conduct a pat-down search of Bell, which produced two bags filled with
227
glassine envelopes of heroin.

216. 5 LaFave, supra note 7, § 10.6(c), at 291 n.58.
217. United States v. Hartwell, 296 F. Supp. 2d. 596, 602 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
218. On September 11, 1970, President Nixon announced that airlines would be required
to employ electronic surveillance equipment at all U.S. airports. See Davis, 482 F.2d at 899

& n.17.
219. Airplane ticket agents would designate persons checking in at the airport as
"selectees" if they had characteristics fitting a secret hijacker profile developed by the
Federal Aviation Association ("FAA"). Notices were posted conspicuously around the
terminals warning passengers of a potential search of their luggage and persons. All
passengers passed through a magnetometer device, but only activation by selectees attracted
further investigation.

Airline officials would summon a federal marshal to question the

selectee. If the selectee failed to furnish adequate identification and pass though the device
again without activating it, the federal marshal might frisk the selectee or search his carry-on
luggage. See 5 LaFave, supra note 7, § 10.6(a), at 279-80.
220. See Patrick W. McGinley & Stephen F. Downs, Airport Searches and Seizures-A
ReasonableApproach, 41 Fordham L. Rev. 293, 306 (1972).
221. A contemporary article described the controversy over airport searches as follows:

"Since [the] traditional exceptions to the warrant rule are not applicable to the airport search,
the only justifiable exception is the protective 'frisk' for weapons authorized by Terry v.

Ohio." Id. at 307.
222. United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972).

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id.at 668.
Id. at 668-69.
Id. at 669.
Id.
Id.
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found the pat down of
Bell reasonable under "the test of Terry v. Ohio."228 The marshal knew that
Bell fit the FAA profile, activated the metal detector, could not provide
identification, and had a serious criminal history. Thus, he reasonably
believed that Bell might commit a crime or pose a danger to the marshal or
others. 229 The court dismissed Bell's contention that the initial use of the
metal detector was an unreasonable search because "[n]one of the personal
indignities of the frisk discussed... in Terry are here present. ' 230 The
court deemed the magnetometer screening to be reasonable "[i]n view of
the magnitude of the crime sought to be prevented, [and] the exigencies of
time which clearly precluded the obtaining of a warrant ...",231
Other courts rejected justifying airport procedures under Terry because
fitting the profile did not provide reasonable suspicion for the initial
magnetometer screening. 232 Only six percent of passengers designated by
the profile as selectees and searched actually possessed weapons. 233 This
hardly would "warrant a reasonably prudent man in the belief' that any

228. Id.at 672.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 673.
23 1. Id. Chief Judge Henry Friendly of the Second Circuit wrote in concurrence to assert
that the power to search passengers for weapons extended beyond situations where
articulable facts-such as a profile match or activation of the magnetometer screening-give
rise to suspicion of the targeted passenger. Id.at 674 (Friendly, C.J., concurring). The
Fourth Amendment limits this power only by requiring reasonableness, which is determined
simply by the "weighing of the harm against the need." Id. at 675. Chief Judge Friendly
noted that probable cause is usually the appropriate standard when a search seeks to discover
evidence of a past crime. Terry's lower standard applies when a suspect's behavior leads an
officer to reasonably believe that "'criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons whom
he is dealing with may be armed and presently dangerous."' Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 30 (1962)). However,
[w]hen the risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and millions of dollars
of property inherent in the pirating or blowing up of a large airplane, the danger
alone meets the tests of reasonableness, so long as the search is conducted in good
faith for the purpose of preventing hijacking or like damage and with reasonable
scope and the passenger has been given advance notice of his liability to such a
search so that he can avoid it by choosing not to travel by air."
Id. While the use of the hijacker profile was a permissible means of minimizing
inconvenience, Chief Judge Friendly would "have no difficulty in sustaining a search...
based on nothing more than the trained intuition" of officials. Id. This concurrence incited
Judge Walter Mansfield to write a concurring opinion in response. He disagreed that the
gravity of the threat of air piracy in itself justified searching all passengers, "measured only
by the good faith of those conducting the search, regardless of the absence of grounds for
suspecting that the passengers searched are potential hijackers." Id. Such a "vague"
principle would eliminate the Fourth Amendment's "carefully constructed" and time-tested
safeguards-the warrant and probable cause requirements. Id. It would also lack a limiting
principle to prevent extension of suspicionless searches to many other contexts (for example,
searches of individuals within high crime areas in response to increasing crime rates). Id. at
675-76.
232. United States v. Moore, 483 F.2d 1361, 1363 (9th Cir. 1973); People v. Hyde, 524
P.2d 830, 832-34 (Cal. 1974).
233. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1097 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
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particular selectee was armed. 234 Thus the profile method provided
a weak
23 5
justification for the initial magnetometer search under Terry.
Bell presented a fairly straightforward case for application of the Terry
exception because the detained individual exhibited highly suspicious
behavior. However, applying Terry's rationale, which was grounded in
objective facts creating reasonable suspicion of danger, became untenable
when the FAA mandated the search of all passengers and carry-on
luggage. 236 No longer did the use of the hijacker profile present objective
grounds for suspicion that justified the search. 237 The lower courts all
continued to apply the balancing test and to validate airport search
procedures, provided that the search was limited in scope to prevent the
smuggling of weapons on board and passengers had notice of the search
and could avoid it by electing not to fly. 238 However, as will be discussed
in more detail below, the U.S. Courts of Appeals never reached consensus
on the exception excusing airport searches from the warrant or probable
239
cause requirements.
2. Supreme Court Treatment
The Supreme Court has never reviewed airport screening procedures or
explained which exception justifies departure from the warrant and
probable cause requirements. 240 On several occasions, the Supreme Court
has cited with approval the consistent finding by lower courts that the
Fourth Amendment permits airport searches. In Von Raab, the Court
described airport search cases as illustrative of the proposition that where
"the possible harm against which the Government seeks to guard is
substantial, the need to prevent its occurrence furnishes an ample
justification for reasonable searches calculated to advance the
Government's goal."' 24 1 The Court characterized these opinions as
"applying our precedents dealing with administrative searches. ' 242 In fact,
of the three airport search cases cited by the Court, only one justified the
airport search as an administrative search. 24 3 A footnote in Von Raab went
234. Hyde, 524 P.2d at 833; 5 LaFave, supra note 7, § 10.6(b), at 287.

235. Some court decisions, like Bell, took the position that the magnetometer screening
alone was so minimally intrusive that it did not constitute a search under the Fourth
Amendment. United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180, 1182 (3d Cir. 1972); Bell, 464 F.2d at
673; United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir. 1972); see also Note, The
ConstitutionalityofAirport Searches, 72 Mich. L. Rev. 128, 135 (1973).
236. This mandate took effect in January 1973. Note, Airport Searches: Fourth
Amendment Anomalies, 48 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1043, 1044 (1973).
237. 5 LaFave, supra note 7, § 10.6(c), at 291 & n.56; see United States v. Edwards, 498
F. 2d. 496, 497-98 (2d Cir. 1974).
238. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973).
239. See infra Part II.
240. 5 LaFave, supra note 7, § 10.6(c), at 291 n.58.
241. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674-75 (1989).

242. Id. at 675 n.3.
243. Id. The other two airport cases cited in Von Raab are United States v. Edwards, 498
F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1974) and United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973).
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on to quote one circuit opinion holding that the "danger [of air piracy] alone
meets the test of reasonableness" if the search is conducted in good faith to
prevent hijacking, is reasonable in scope to achieve this end, and provides
the passenger with notice and an opportunity to avoid the search by electing
not to fly. 244 The Court continued that the government's power to conduct
airport searches does not hinge upon demonstration of a threat to a
particular airport or airline. 24 5
This is because the searches were
implemented "in response to an observable national and international
hijacking crisis" and "[i]t is sufficient that the Government have a
compelling interest in preventing an otherwise pervasive societal problem
from spreading to the particular context. '246 Finally, the Court asserted that
the search's validity did not "necessarily turn[]" on its success in exposing
piracy attempts. 24 7 To the contrary, the Court viewed the fact that nearly all
of the billions of passengers searched possessed no weapons as evidence of
248
successful deterrence.
In Chandler, the Court referenced airport searches to support the
proposition that "where the risk to public safety is substantial and real,
searches calibrated to the risk may rank as
blanket suspicionless
'reasonable.' 249 Citing Von Raab, the Court in Chandler qualified this
statement by adding that where the "public safety is not genuinely in
jeopardy, the Fourth Amendment precludes the suspicionless search, no
matter how conveniently arranged. ' 250 The Court also showed approval of
airport searches in the recent checkpoint seizure case, City of Indianapolis
v. Edmond.25 1 The Court stated that its inquiry into the primary purpose of
the checkpoint program did not "affect the validity of... searches in
airports ... , where the need for such measures to ensure public safety can
be particularly acute." 252 In the 2002 case of United States v. Drayton, the
dissent recognized that "[a]nyone who travels by air today submits to
searches of the person and luggage as a condition of boarding the
aircraft. '253 However, the dissent further stated that "[t]he commonplace
precautions of air travel have not, thus far, been justified for ground

Edwards found the administrative search doctrine "most nearly applicable" to the airport
search context rather than other proposed exceptions. 498 F.2d at 498 n.5. The court there
declined, however, "to fold airport searches under the rubric" of administrative searches. Id.
Rather, it proceeded directly to the reasonableness analysis, in apparent defiance of the
"heavy judicial gloss that a warrantless search is invalid unless within an appropriate
exception."' Id. at 498. Skipwith relied upon the border search doctrine. 482 F.2d at 1276.
244. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 675 n.3. (quoting Edwards, 498 F.2d at 496).
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id
249. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997).
250. Id.
251. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
252. Id. at 47-48.
253. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 208 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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transportation ... and no such conditions have been placed on passengers
2 54
getting on trains or buses."
The Court has also suggested approval of suspicionless measures to
prevent terrorism in other contexts. The Court in Edmond averred to the
probable constitutionality of a police roadblock checkpoint to prevent a
terrorist attack, stating that "the Fourth Amendment would almost certainly
permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set up to thwart an imminent
terrorist attack ... .-"255 In a dissenting opinion to the 2005 case of Illinois
v. Caballes, Justice David Souter expressed "concern[] not to prejudge a
claim of authority to detect explosives and dangerous chemical or
biological weapons that might be carried by a terrorist who prompts no
individualized suspicion," stating that "what is a reasonable search depends
in part on demonstrated risk."'256 In the same case, Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg's dissenting opinion posited that "the immediate, present danger
of explosives would likely justify a bomb [dog] sniff under the special
7
needs doctrine." 25
D. The Mass TransitSearch Programs in New York City andBoston
Recent years have witnessed an upsurge of terrorist attacks upon
passenger rail systems worldwide. 258 According to one study, over two
hundred and fifty attacks upon rail systems between 1995 and June 2005
have claimed nearly nine hundred lives and injured over six thousand
people. 259 These attacks include the 1995 sarin gas attack on Tokyo's
subway, system that killed twelve and injured over five thousand, 260 the
February 2004 bombing of the Moscow Metro by Chechen rebels that killed
approximately forty people, and the March 2004 bombing of a Madrid
commuter train by an Al Qaeda affiliate organization that killed over two
26 1
hundred.
Urban mass transit systems are designed to be highly open and
accessible, making them difficult to secure against attack. 262 A high
number of passengers access the system through multiple points of entry
spread over large geographical areas. 263 This makes monitoring and
controlling persons entering the system far more difficult than at an

254. Id.
255. Edmond, 531 U.S. at44.
256. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 417 n.7 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting). This case
held that a dog sniff of a vehicle pulled over for a traffic violation did not constitute a search.
Id.at 409-10.
257. Id.at 425 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
258. Passenger Rail Security, supra note 2, at 10.
259. See id.
260. Id.
261. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., No. 0411652, 2004 WL 1682859, at *2 (D. Mass. July 28, 2004).
262. Passenger Rail Security, supra note 2, at 10.
263. Id.
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airport. 264 The openness, high ridership, expensive infrastructure, and
economic importance of mass transit systems have made them attractive
targets for terrorists because an attack can produce high casualties and
26 5
cause economic disruption to an entire metropolitan area.
1. New York City's Program
On July 22, 2005, New York City's Mayor Michael Bloomberg and
Police Commissioner Ray Kelly announced that the New York Police
Department ("NYPD") would begin searching the backpacks and bags of
subway riders as they entered the City's subway system. 266
The
announcement of the Container Inspection Program came just hours after
terrorists tried to detonate four bombs within the London Underground and
two weeks after successful attacks there claimed fifty-six lives. 267 The
Mayor assured riders of the safety of New York's transit system,
emphasizing that no specific threat had been made against it. 2 6 8 The Police
Commissioner promised that the program would take a "systematic
approach" and that officers in the field would receive instruction on how to
' 2 69
conduct the searches "in accordance with the law and the Constitution."
Another police spokesperson indicated that the searches would continue
2 70
"indefinitely."
The New York City subway system runs twenty-four hours a day and
consists of twenty-six interconnected lines and 468 passenger stations,
many of which have multiple entrances. 27 1 The system is the most heavily
used subway system in the United States. 272 Each weekday it carries
2 73
upwards of 4.7 million passengers.
Under its Container Inspection Program, the NYPD establishes daily
checkpoints at the entrances of selected subway stations, setting up tables in
front of the entrances' turnstiles to conduct inspections just before riders

264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Sewell Chan & Kareem Fahim, New York Starts To Inspect Bags On The Subways,
N.Y. Times, July 22, 2005, at Al.

267. Alan Cowell, Bombs Set at 4 London Sites, but Fail to Explode, N.Y. Times, July 22,
2005, at Al.
268. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Request for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief at 5, MacWade v. Kelly, 2005 WL 3338573 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2005) (No.
05CIV692 1) [hereinafter NYCLU's Pre-Trial Brief]. One day after the announcement, New
York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg stated that "[the program] is partially designed to
make people feel comfortable. That's part of the security thing. You want to make people
comfortable. You also want to have substance and make sure you keep the potential threats
away. We still have not had any specific threats that the public should worry about." Id.
269. Chan & Fahim, supra note 266, at Al.
270. Id.at B5.
271. MacWade v. Kelly, No. 05CIV6921, 2005 WL 3338573, at *4.
272. Id.
273. Chan & Fahim, supra note 266, at Al.
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enter the system. 2 74 Notices posted at the selected stations inform riders
that "backpacks and other containers [are] subject to inspection. '2 75 The
NYPD does not disclose to the public the number or location of stations
where searches are being conducted each day or the frequency of
inspections at each checkpoint. 276 At any given time, no inspections are
conducted at most of the entrances to the system's 468 stations. 277 On
certain days in early October 2005, the city increased the number of
checkpoints and inspections in response to information reporting a
278
heightened threat of terrorist attack against the system.
Officers select riders according to a numerical formula. For instance,
every twelfth, fifteenth, or twentieth rider carrying a container large enough
to conceal an explosive device is selected for search. 27 9 A supervising
officer sets the numerical formula based upon factors such as the number of
2 80
available officers and the volume of people entering the stations.
Officers have been instructed that the inspections must be limited in scope
to determine whether a backpack or bag contains an explosive device and
have been trained to recognize explosive devices. 28 1 Officers may not
inspect containers too small to hold an explosive device. The determination
of what size container may be subject to inspection is left to the discretion
of the officers. 282 Officers also may not intentionally look for other
283
contraband or attempt to read any printed material in the container.
During a typical inspection, which lasts "seconds and not minutes," a
passenger opens up his or her containers to expose its contents to the
inspecting officer's view. 284 Officers have discretion to manipulate the
285
contents of the container in order to move items obstructing their view.
Selected riders can refuse the search and leave the station. However,
they are prohibited from passing through the turnstile and entering the
transit system at that time. 286 Refusing the search does not provide a basis
for arrest.2 8 7 In fact, no action is taken against individuals who refuse a
search and walk away, or who walk away after seeing the checkpoint but

274. Defendant's Pre-Trial Memorandum of Law at 3-4, MacWade v. Kelly, 2005 WL

3338573 (No. 05CIV6921) [hereinafter City's Pre-Trial Brief].
275. MacWade, 2005 WL 3338573, at *7.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.at *7 n.13.
279. Id.at *7.
280. Id.

281. Id.at *6.
282. Id.at *6-*7. But see NYCLU's Pre-Trial Brief, supra note 268, at 6 ("The NYPD is
searching the bags or containers of people without the bag or container having to be any
minimum size. Thus, everything from women's purses to large backpacks are subject to
search.").
283. MacWade, 2005 WL 3338573, at *6.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
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before the officer requests to search. 288 Presumably, behavior that causes
the inspecting officer to become reasonably suspicious of the individual
would justify further investigation under the Terry principle. 28 9 Absent
such suspicion, nothing prevents individuals who refuse290the search from
attempting to access the subway system at another station.
The New York Civil Liberties Union ("NYCLU"), representing five
subway riders, filed a § 1983 action against the City and its Police
Commissioner in the Southern District of New York in August of 2005,
291
challenging the search program as a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The complaint alleged that thousands of riders have had their possessions
illegally searched and requested a declaratory judgment and an injunction
against the program. 292 The NYCLU's principal challenge was that, under
Second Circuit precedent, 293 the search cannot qualify as a special needs
search because it is neither minimally intrusive nor maximally effective,
and it does not target individuals with a diminished expectation of
privacy. 294 The City also framed the subway search program as a special
needs search, implemented to "increase deterrence and detection of
activity and to give greater protection to the mass transit
potential terrorist
29 5
riding public."
288. Id.; NYCLU's Pre-Trial Brief, supra note 268, at 6.
289. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
290. However, individuals that refuse to submit to an inspection and are caught
attempting to enter at the same station through another entrance may be arrested. See
MacWade, 2005 WL 3338573, at *7 n.14.
291. Complaint, MacWade v. Kelly, No. 05 Civ 6921 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2005)
[hereinafter NYCLU Complaint].
1,41.
292. Id. at
293. See United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 186 (2d Cir. 2004).
294. See NYCLU's Pre-Trial Brief, supra note 268, at 13-15. The New York Civil
Liberties Union ("NYCLU") challenged the effectiveness of the Container Inspection
Program in preventing an attack. First, the NYCLU noted that no instance of terrorist
activity has been detected, despite its estimation that the subway system had been entered
400 million times between the adoption of the policy and the trial. Id. at 6. Second, the
NYCLU contended that the voluntary nature of the inspections, combined with the subway
system's design, makes the program devoid of any "meaningful value" in preventing
terrorists from carrying explosives into the system. Id at 7. Each subway line connects to
multiple other lines and many lines run twenty-four hours a day, allowing riders to access
any point in the system from any station at all hours. Id. at 4. Many of the stations have
multiple entrances, and generally these entrances are not visible to an officer conducting
searches at another entrance. Id. at 3. Furthermore, many stations, particularly within
Manhattan, are within close walking distance of others. Id. at 3-4. The NYCLU claimed that
these features make the City's search program futile. Nothing prevents a selected rider who
withholds consent to a search from attempting to enter the system at another station or even
at a different entrance to the same station. Id. at 4. Because searches are conducted at only a
minority of stations at any given time, such an attempt is likely to succeed. See id. at 7. The
NYCLU argued that terrorists could easily evade checkpoints and access any point within
the subway system despite the program checkpoints, thus calling into doubt the program's
efficacy in detecting and deterring terrorist attempts. Id.
295. City's Pre-Trial Brief, supra note 274, at 8. The City asserted that the special needs
doctrine is available when, "based upon special needs unrelated to law enforcement. . . the
searches (1) address a serious special threat to public health and safety; (2) minimally
implicate privacy interests; and (3) reasonably promote the goal of countermanding the
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Following a two-day bench trial, the district court in MacWade v. Kelly
found that New York City's random search program fell within the special
needs exception, excusing the program from the warrant and probable cause
requirements and from the norm that searches must usually be predicated on
some measure of individualized suspicion. 296 The court then balanced the
competing interests to assess the program's reasonableness. The court
found the government's interest compelling, simply stating that "[t]he need
to prevent a terrorist bombing of the New York City subway system is a
governmental interest of the very highest order.

' 297

It then concluded that

the City's expert witnesses persuaded the court that the program is a
reasonable method of accomplishing this end and that reasonable
effectiveness is all that the Fourth Amendment demands. 2 98 The City's
experts had testified that the randomness of the search program deters

terrorist attempts because it injects "uncertainty and unpredictability [in]to
the planning and implementation of a terrorist attack which, in turn,
increases the risk of failure and helps to deter an attack. ' 299 This rebutted
the NYCLU's claim that because checkpoints are erected at only a few
threat." Id.at 5 (citing Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427 (2004); Bd. of Educ. v. Earls,
536 U.S. 822, 830, 834, 837-38 (2002)). Claiming that suspicionless searches were first
permitted in airports and courthouses, New York City noted that courts have approved of
extending such searches to new contexts and urged a similar extension to meet the emerging
terrorist threat against mass transit systems. Id.at 6-7. To surpass Edmond's limitation that
suspicionless intrusions may not primarily intend to further a "general interest in crime
control," the City noted that it implemented the program shortly after the attacks upon
London's subway system. Id.at 8. It also distinguished the program from a "typical crime
control tactic" by stating that the New York Police Department ("NYPD") permits riders
selected for inspection to leave the subway station without being searched, although persons
found with contraband would be arrested. Id.at 8-9. Addressing the government interest in
the balancing analysis, the City presented expert witnesses to testify that mass transit
systems have become a more attractive target since airport security was tightened following
September 11, 2001, that recovered Al Qaeda manuals explicitly endorse "blasting and
destroying bridges leading into and out of the cities," and that the NYPD has uncovered plots
to bomb tunnels and subway stations. Id.at 9. Furthermore, the City pointed to recent mass
transit bombings in Moscow, Madrid, and London as revealing the vulnerabilities of mass
transit systems and the desire and capacity of terrorists to exploit them. Id.The City argued
that "protective measures need not await intelligence of a specific threat." Id. at 10. Rather,
it urged the court to take judicial notice of the threat in light of the 9/11 attack and recent
international attacks, as courts have done with respect to courthouse, airport, and mass transit
security. Id.at 9-10. The City then asserted that the search minimally intrudes upon privacy
interests. First, widespread media coverage of the program, as well as loud-speaker
announcements and posted notices warning of a potential search, provides riders with
advance notice of the searches. Id.at 12-13. The City maintained that such advance notice
mitigates the intrusiveness of the search by reducing surprise and allowing riders to avoid the
search by avoiding the transit system or carrying containers into it. Id. Finally, the City
asserted that the Container Inspection Program was a "reasonable means of advancing the
city's goal of detecting and deterring mass transit terrorist activity," and that the search need
only be reasonably effective in advancing a special need. Id.at 17-18.
296. MacWade v. Kelly, No. 05CIV6921, 2005 WL 3338573, at *16-*20 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
7, 2005). The court's application of the special needs doctrine will be discussed infra Part
II.B.
297. Id.at* 17.
298. Id. at *18-*19.
299. Id. at *12.
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passengers can refuse the search, the program
stations each day and selected
300
had little deterrent effect.
The court then turned to the privacy interest of subway riders implicated
30 1
by the program and found the intrusion to be minimal for four reasons.
First, a "prominently displayed sign" and public announcements give
subway riders notice of the searches, reducing the riders' subjective fright
or surprise by the encounter. 30 2 Second, searches are conducted in the
open, near a subway's entrance, by uniformed police officers. 30 3 The
program prohibits officers from exercising discretion in selecting whom to
search, other than deciding what size bag or backpack is large enough to
contain an explosive. 30 4 Third, a selected rider can refuse the search and
leave the station, and this 'element of voluntariness"' serves to mitigate
the intrusion. 30 5 Finally, the scope of the search is limited: Officers may
not inspect containers too small to hold an explosive device and may not
30 6
attempt to read any written or printed material inside the container.
Officers only manipulate the contents of the container when necessary to
confirm that no explosives are inside, and the entire inspection typically
lasts only a few seconds. 30 7 Balancing the compelling need to deter
terrorist attacks and the effectiveness of the program against the minimal
deemed New York City's subway search
privacy intrusion, the 30court
8
program constitutional.
2. Boston's Program
A year before New York City instituted its Container Inspection
Program, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority ("MBTA")
implemented a subway search program during the 2004 Democratic
National Convention at Boston's Fleet Center. 30 9 Originally, the MBTA
program was designed similar to New York City's, with officers conducting
random searches of passengers as they entered the system according to a
numerical formula. 31 0 However, on the days that the convention took place,
300. Id.at * 13 ("Apart from presenting the ironic position that less intrusiveness renders
the Program less effective, [plaintiffs' expert] offered no evidence of the measure of 'enough
uncertainty,' and he did not at all rebut the evidence presented by Defendants that the
Program has a meaningful deterrent effect.").
301. Id.at *18-*19.
302. Id.at *19.
303. Id.

304. Id.
305. Id.(quoting United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 807-08, 808 n.15 (2d Cir.
1974)).
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.at *19-*20.
309. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., No. 0411652, 2004 WL 1682859, at *1 (D. Mass. July 28, 2004).
310. See Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction, American-Arab AntiDiscrimination Comm. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., No. 04-11652, 2004 WL 1682859 (D.
Mass. July 28, 2004) [hereinafter American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.'s Brief].
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MBTA officials searched the hand-carried items of all passengers while
they rode on certain subway lines and bus routes that passed underneath or
near the convention center. 3 1 1 This policy accorded with a Secret Service
directive requiring the search of bags and backpacks of all persons who
3 12
passed through a perimeter established around the convention center.
The American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee filed suit requesting a
temporary injunction against the search program, which the district court
3 13
denied.
The district court deemed the subway searches to fall within the
administrative search exception to the warrant and probable cause
requirements, relying on circuit court decisions applying this rationale to
airport searches. 3 14 Turning to the balancing test to determine if the
program was reasonable, the court determined that the MBTA's policy
implicated a compelling public interest. The court noted that international
terrorists had bombed the public transit systems in Moscow and Madrid
within the previous year and that the Madrid bombing was targeted to
disrupt Spain's national elections. 3 15 Therefore, the court found it
reasonable to suppose that "national party nominating conventions could
become terrorist targets, and when the conventions are held in cities with
significant mass transportation systems that serve the convention locations,
it is not without foundation to worry that a terrorist event might be aimed
simultaneously at the convention and the transit system." 316 Although no
intelligence warned of a specific threat against the MBTA system or the
Fleet Center, the court found it too speculative to assume that such
information would precede an attack. 3 17 Thus, the court declined to assess
the probability of an attack as part of the determination that there was a
sufficient government need to conduct the searches. 3 18 The court also
pointed out that the absence of a specific threat does not destroy the
authority to conduct blanket airport screenings, because "[w]hen the threat
'31 9
is to any flight, every flight may be protected by the security searches.
After finding a compelling interest for the searches, the court next
addressed the searches' intrusion on privacy. The court described the
intrusion as "not insignificant" because "[p]assengers are required to open
all bags and similar carried-on items to visual inspection, exposing to view
what they would otherwise have kept unseen. ' 320 The court immediately
turned to two aspects of the MBTA's policy which mitigated the intrusion.
311. American-Arab Anti-DiscriminationComm., 2004 WL 1682859, at *1.

312. Id.

313. Id. at *1,*4.
314.
seizure
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

Id.at * 1. Plaintiffs urged the trial court to analyze the searches under the checkpoint
exception. See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.'s Brief, supra note 310.
American-Arab Anti-DiscriminationComm., 2004 WL 1682859, at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at *3.
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a variety of ways" notice that passengers
First, the MBTA published "in
"may be subject to search. '32 1 Notice "tends to reduce the subjective
anxiety" that would be caused by an unexpected search. 322 Notice also
allows passengers objecting to the intrusion to avoid it by refraining from
use of the transit system on the days that the MBTA conducted the
searches. 323 The court would have preferred notice that each passenger on
certain routes would be searched, rather than the notice actually provided by
the MBTA that passengers on all routes may be searched. 324 However, this
notice, while
flaw did not undermine the program's reasonableness because
325
important, is not a "necessary element" of a search plan.
The second mitigating fact, according to the court, was the program's
limited scope and duration. Searches were conducted only of passengers
traveling past the convention center and only during the four days that the
convention was held. 32 6 The court also noted that the policy ceded officers
no discretion over whom to search, provided for supervision, and required
record-keeping to facilitate later review of the inspections. 327 Because the
intrusion was reasonable and "very similar to the intrusions imposed under
other, increasingly common, administrative security search regimes," the
plaintiffs failed to established a likelihood of success on their Fourth
challenge and the court denied their motion for injunctive
Amendment
328
relief.
II. How SHOULD COURTS CHARACTERIZE SUSPICIONLESS SEARCHES OF
MASS TRANSIT PASSENGERS TO PREVENT TERRORISM?

The Supreme Court has not developed a coherent doctrine that explains
when the reasonableness balancing test supplants the warrant and probable
cause requirements, 329 a threshold question for considering the validity of a
suspicionless search or seizure. Early cases following Camara seemed to
indicate that individualized suspicion is unnecessary whenever such
requirements would frustrate the search or seizure's ends. 330 In Edmond,
however, the Court enumerated three "limited circumstances" in which a
suspicionless search or seizure is permitted under the Fourth Amendment:
an administrative search, a roadblock checkpoint, and a special needs
search.

33 1

Noticeably absent from this list are the screening procedures conducted at
airports. The Supreme Court never granted certiorari of the lower courts'
321. Id.
322. Id.

323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id.
See supra notes 17-27 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557 (1976).
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37-38 (2000).

3270

FORDHAMLA W REVIEW

[Vol. 74

consistent and longstanding validation of these searches, 332 but the Court
has discussed these decisions with approval. 333 Although all circuits have
excused airport searches from the warrant and probable cause
requirements, 334 they never reached consensus on the justification for this
departure. 335 Perhaps paying heed to the then-predominant warrant
preference rule, some courts fit airport searches into recognized exceptions
such as the administrative search 336 or border search 3 37 doctrines. The
Second Circuit, perhaps anticipating the rise of the general reasonableness
standard to compete with the warrant preference rule as a model of Fourth
Amendment analysis, applied the balancing test without relying on a
3 38
recognized exception.
Airport searches are highly analogous to the searches recently
implemented on urban mass transportation systems. Courts considering
mass transit search programs might adopt one of the exceptions applied to
airport searches by the circuit courts, as did the district court in AmericanArab Anti-DiscriminationCommittee.339 Courts might also characterize the
mass transit searches as fitting within the checkpoint or the special needs
doctrines, both of which developed after the circuit courts validated airport
searches. 340 Because passengers receive notice that entry into the mass
transit system is conditioned on surrendering to the search, the Court could
characterize the searches as consensual. Still, the Court might declare that a
general reasonableness standard applies, abandoning the warrant preference
rule and, consequently, the need to fit a recognized exception. Finally, the
Court could determine that searches on mass transportation systems to
prevent terrorism fall within a sui generis exception, distinct from the other
34 1
recognized doctrines.
Any approach, except one finding that the searches are consensual, would
ultimately culminate in a balancing of competing interests to determine the
search's reasonableness. Therefore, the specific exception applied might
not affect the constitutionality of the mass transit searches. However, the
manner in which the Court squares the suspicionless subway searches with
the traditional warrant and probable cause requirements impacts the
consistency of search and seizure jurisprudence and the strength of the
warrant preference rule.
The following sections will evaluate the

332. 5 LaFave, supra note 7, § 10.6(c), at 291 n.58.
333. See supra Part I.C.2.
334. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
335. See, e.g., United States v. Hartwell, 296 F. Supp. 2d. 596, 602 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
336. See United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 905-08 (9th Cir. 1973).
337. See United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973) ("[Tjhe
standards for initiating a search of a person at the boarding gate should be no more stringent
than those applied in border crossing situations.").
338. United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 498 (2d Cir. 1974).
339.
11652,
340.
341.

American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., No. 042004 WL 1682859 (D. Mass. July 28, 2004).
See supra Part I.B.2.b-c.
See Note, The ConstitutionalityofAirport Searches, supra note 235, at 153.
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advantages and disadvantages of applying the eligible doctrines to mass
transit search programs.
A. The Administrative Search Doctrine
When airports adopted screening procedures requiring the search of all
passengers and their carry-on luggage, the Ninth Circuit in United States v.
Davis rejected characterizing the airport search as a variant of the Terry
stop and frisk. 342 Rather, the court found that "[t]he appropriate standards
for evaluating the airport search program under the Fourth Amendment are
found in a series of Supreme Court cases relating to 'administrative'
searches." 343 Davis defined this exception very broadly. Grouping together
Camara,344 Biswell,345 See,346 and a Supreme Court decision allowing
347
warrantless inspections of the residences of public assistance recipients,
the court determined that
[t]he essence of these decisions is that searches conducted as part of a
general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose,
rather than as part of a criminal investigation to secure evidence of crime,
may be permissible under the Fourth Amendment though not supported
by a showing34of
probable cause directed to a particular place or person to
8
be searched.
The court deemed airport screenings to be carried out as part of a general
regulatory scheme for the "administrative purpose" of preventing weapons
and explosives from being carried on board. 34 9 The fact that weapons or
explosives detected would be used for a criminal prosecution did not
change the administrative nature of the airport search. 350 The court noted
that one purpose of the inspections upheld in Biswell and Camara was the
discovery of regulatory code violations. Thus, the potential that airport
searches would reveal contraband and lead to arrests for violations of the

342. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 905-08 (9th Cir. 1973).
343. Id.at 908. A recent decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
confirmed that Davis remains good law. Gilmore v. Gonzales, No. 04-15736, slip op. 1135,
1157-58 (9th Cir. Jan. 26, 2006). However, the decision seems to place less emphasis on
labeling airport searches as "administrative," stating simply that "[a]irport screening
searches.., do not per se violate a traveler's Fourth Amendment rights, and therefore must
be analyzed for reasonableness." Id.at 1158.
344. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); see supra notes 53-64 and
accompanying text.
345. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); see supra notes 114-116 and
accompanying text.
346. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967) (holding that determining whether
probable cause for a warrant exists for an administrative agency's seizure of corporate
records will be measured "against a flexible standard of reasonableness that takes into
account the public need for effective enforcement of the particular regulation involved").
347. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (holding that requiring a warrantless home
visit as a condition for receipt of welfare benefits does not violate the Fourth Amendment).
348. Davis,482 F.2d at 908.
349. Id.
350. Id.
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criminal law "does not alter the essentially administrative nature of the
screening process." 35 1 However, the airline screenings would cease to be
administrative if they became "subverted into a general search for evidence
352
of crime."
The district court in American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee
found there to be "no reason to have separate constitutional analyses for
353
urban mass transportation systems and for airline transportation."
Despite differences in the security measures employed, "the fundamental
issues should not be substantially affected by the mode of transportation
involved. ' 354 Citing Davis, the court determined that the MBTA's search
355
program fell within the administrative search exception.
Davis's broad interpretation of the administrative search doctrine-that
searches furthering any non-law-enforcement purpose may be conducted
without probable cause directed to a particular person-is arguably faithful
to the holding of Camara.356 Camara did not limit its redefined probable
cause standard to housing inspections. Rather, the Court there drew a
distinction between what reasonableness demands in searches to uncover
evidence of past crimes and in searches to prevent the development of
inconspicuous but highly dangerous conditions. 357 The latter requires only
that the need to search or seize outweighs the injury to privacy. And, as
early cases applying Camara found, if this balancing test favors the
government interest in taking the administrative action, reasonableness does
not necessarily require officials to form suspicion if such a requirement
35 8
would frustrate the ends of the search.
Such an expansive view of the administrative search doctrine is subject to
criticism on several grounds. First, in a recent decision the Court has
indicated that this doctrine is limited to inspections of highly regulated
businesses. 3 59 Colonnade Catering Corp., Biswell, and later cases permit

351. Id.

352. Id. at 909.
353. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., No. 0411652, 2004 WL 1682859, at *2 (D. Mass. July 28, 2004).
354. Id.
355. Id. The court also stated that "administrative searches have been upheld in the face
of objections that they violated the Fourth Amendment." Id. at *1. To support this
proposition, the court cited authorities finding airport searches and searches at the entrances
to courthouses to be administrative. It also cited cases that excused the warrant and probable
cause requirements by applying the consent and special needs exceptions. Id.
356. See Note, Airport Searches: FourthAmendment Anomalies, supra note 236, at 1058
("Courts that adopted the Camaraapproach in the context of airport searches recognized that
these searches are prompted by a unique kind of administrative necessity and are separable
from the normal routine of law enforcement.").
357. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967).
358. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557 (1976).
359. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 83 n.21 (2001). However, the Court in
Edmond described the administrative search exception as encompassing not only searches of
heavily regulated businesses, but also investigative searches of fire-damaged commercial
premises and inspections of residential structures to ensure compliance with local housing
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warrantless inspections of business premises because the Court found that a
business proprietor's participation in a heavily regulated industry
corresponds to a decreased expectation of privacy. 360 Even though the
airline and mass transit industries have traditionally been heavily regulated,
it is operators, not passengers, who have a diminished expectation of
privacy. 36 1 Soon after Davis was decided, the Supreme Court rejected
extension of the administrative search doctrine to permit warrantless
seizures of persons not engaged in business. 362 The Court held that "[a]
central difference between [Colonnade and Biswell] and this [case] is that
businessmen engaged in such federally licensed and regulated enterprises
accept the burdens as well as the benefits of their trade, whereas the
363
petitioner here was not engaged in any regulated or licensed business."
The Court might declare that a passenger's expectation of privacy in
luggage is diminished when he or she enters a mass transit system so as to
allow warrantless and suspicionless inspections, but this exception to the
warrant and probable cause requirements would be distinct from the cases
allowing warrantless inspections of business premises.
Second, it is unclear whether warrantless searches of passengers could be
justified under Camara,which did not involve a heavily regulated industry
364
but nevertheless allowed inspections without individualized suspicion.
Camara itself does not provide an exception to the warrant requirement for
all searches that might be labeled "administrative."
In fact, Camara
overruled a decision which had upheld warrantless housing inspections,
finding that statutory safeguards regulating inspections were an insufficient
substitute for the protections of the warrant procedure and that the public
interest in enforcing the housing code did not preclude securing a
365
warrant.
Even if the warrant requirement were excused, some commentators have
argued that the airport searches could not satisfy Camara's reasonableness
codes. Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (citing Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S.
499, 507-09, 511-12 (1978); Camara,387 U.S. at 534-39).
360. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 701 (1987); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S.
311,316 (1972); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 75-76 (1970).
361. See Note, The ConstitutionalityofAirport Searches, supra note 235, at 144. But see
Simcha Herzog, Constitutional Problems Posed By Aviation Security Post September

Eleventh, 6 Fla. Coastal L. Rev. 361, 376 (2005) ("Airport searches fit neatly into the
administrative search rationale because air travel is a heavily regulated activity and has
become more regulated post September 11.").
362. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
363. Id.at 271. This language dissuaded other circuits from adopting Davis's expansive
administrative search rationale in considering airport searches. See United States v.
Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 498 n.5 (2d Cir. 1974) ("[T]he principle that seems most nearly
applicable to the airport search is that recognized in Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United
States, and applied in United States v. Biswell .... But since an attempt to fold airport
searches under the rubric of this type of administrative search would entail the question of
reasonableness, as well as the need for dealing with language in Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, the issue of reasonableness may as well be faced directly." (citations omitted)).
364. Camara,387 U.S. 523.

365. Id.at 533.
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standard. 366 Camara found the housing inspections to be reasonable
because of a long history of public acceptance, because dangerous
conditions must be corrected but "acceptable results" would not be achieved
if officials must first develop suspicion that violations exist in any particular
'367
dwelling, and because the inspections were not "personal in nature.
Airport searches enjoyed no long history of public acceptance when the
circuit courts first deemed them to be administrative searches, nor is there
any history of acceptance of suspicionless subway searches. 368 Camara's
second prong is arguably established: A terrorist attack is a threat that the
public interest demands be prevented. Requiring officials to develop
suspicion that any particular passenger poses a threat would fail to achieve
"acceptable results" because there is little reason to expect that a terrorist
would exhibit suspicious behavior while entering a mass transit system with
explosives. 369 Furthermore, acceptable results in preventing terrorism
demand a higher level of deterrence than that generally achieved by
370
ordinary, suspicion-based law enforcement techniques.
As to Camara's third prong, searches of luggage could arguably be
considered more personal in nature than housing inspections. 37 1 The latter
are "directed toward such facilities as the plumbing, heating, ventilation,
gas, and electrical systems. ' 372 In contrast, passenger luggage is used to
store personal items that one would like to keep private. 37 3 However, as
Professor Wayne LaFave asserts, Camara's third prong can be interpreted
as allowing a departure from the normal standard of probable cause
whenever the intrusiveness is less than that of a search in the context of a
criminal investigation. 374 Airport screening procedures and subway
searches, which are brief, narrow in scope, and conducted with notice, are
"similarly less intrusive than the usual search of a criminal suspect's person
375
and belongings."
Another issue is that Camara did not hold that area warrants for housing
inspections could issue without any suspicion at all. 376 Rather, the Court
found probable cause established if legislative or administrative standards,
366. See, e.g., Note, The ConstitutionalityofAirport Searches,supra note 235, at 142.

367. Camara,387 U.S. at 536-37.
368. But see 5 LaFave, supra note 7, § 10.1(b), at 11 (questioning the validity and
significance of Camara's finding that housing inspections enjoyed a long history of public
acceptance).
369. See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., No.
04-11652, 2004 WL 1682859, at *2 (D. Mass. July 28, 2004) ("[T]here is also no reason to
believe that specific information is necessarily, or even frequently, available before a
terrorist attack, so its absence cannot be taken to indicate that the facilities are not likely
targets.").
370. 5 LaFave, supra note 7, § 10.6(c), at 296.
371. See id. § 10.1(b), at 15.
372. Id.
373. See Note, Airport Searches: Fourth Amendment Anomalies, supra note 236, at

1058.
374. 5 LaFave, supra note 7, § 10.6(c), at 297.
375. Id.
376. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538-39 (1967).
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based upon neighborhood housing conditions, suggested that inspections
would likely reveal the existence of code violations in a general area. 37 7
Some have argued that airport searches cannot meet this standard of
probable cause because there is no reason to believe that searching any
group of passengers will uncover weapons or explosives. 378 However, the
airport and subway searches are confined to a general area that officials
have determined is subject to a heightened risk of terrorist attack. 379
Camara's probable cause standard does not demand any minimum amount
of probability that a dangerous condition will be found.
A major problem with applying Davis's expansive interpretation of the
administrative search doctrine is that this interpretation destroys any
internal coherence that this exception attains when "administrative" refers
only to inspections of highly regulated commercial activities or premises. 3 80
Circuit courts rejecting the administrative search rationale for airport
searches criticized this approach
because the label "administrative" lacked
"analytical significance." 3 8 1 By expanding the scope of "administrative" to
encompass all regulatory searches intended to protect public safety rather
than investigate crime, "there seems [to be] no rational limit to what
searches can be ultimately justified on the basis of Camara v. Municipal
Court and See v. City of Seattle, once the reasoning of those cases is
expanded beyond facts which involved detection of local building code
violations." 3 82 Such an expansion could allow the administrative search
exception to significantly undermine the warrant preference rule. An
expansive definition of "administrative" would also cause this exception to
overlap with other exceptions, which might make these other exceptions
redundant.
B. The Special Needs Doctrine
Although the Supreme Court has never held that the special needs
doctrine applies to suspicionless searches on mass transit systems to prevent
terrorism, both parties in MacWade v. Kelly argued that the court should

377. Id.
378. See Note, The Constitutionalityof Airport Searches, supra note 235, at 143 ("[T]he

Camarastandard of 'reduced' probable cause [could] not be met. In the current inspection
system, . . . no evidence is produced that would indicate that violations of the law might exist
in the 'area' or group [of passengers] searched.").
379. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., No. 0411652, 2004 WL 1682859, at *2 (D. Mass. July 28, 2004) ("It is not unreasonable, then, to
think that national party nominating conventions could become terrorist targets, and when
the conventions are held in cities with significant mass transportation systems that serve the
convention locations, it is not without foundation to worry that a terrorist event might be
aimed simultaneously at the convention and the transit system.").
380. See supra Part I.B.2.a.

381. United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 804 n.9 (2d Cir. 1974) ("United States v.
Davis, while styling the airport search as 'administrative,' placed no analytical significance
on this label." (citation omitted)).
382. United States v. Barbera, 514 F.2d 294, 299 n. 12 (2d Cir. 1975) (citations omitted).
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view New York City's search program as a special needs search. 383 The
district court agreed. It stated that the risk to public safety of a terrorist
bombing of New York City's subway system "' is substantial and real,"'
satisfying the limitation imposed by Chandler.384 It also found that the
Container Inspection Program "addresses a problem well beyond the
'385
normal need for law enforcement or a general interest in crime control.
In explaining the special needs doctrine, the court cited not only special
needs cases but also roadblock checkpoint seizure cases. 386 By conflating
the two doctrines, the court in MacWade contradicted the Supreme Court's
statements in Sitz and more recently in Ferguson that the two exceptions are
distinct. 387 This oversimplification also allowed the court to elide a
fundamental and difficult question: whether the special needs doctrine can
apply to a search conducted by law enforcement officials to deter and detect
a criminal act where the fruits of the search would surely be used in a
criminal prosecution. 388 The case law defines special needs as those
"beyond the normal need for law enforcement. '389 However, the doctrine
has developed so as to allow searches that are "unrelated" to law
390
enforcement.
Applying Professor Maclin's framework, the most important question is
whether the primary purpose of the search is a law enforcement purpose,
i.e., to obtain evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution. 39 1 The courts
in Macwade and American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee both
emphasized that the primary purpose of the subway searches was to deter a
terrorist attack. 392 As Professor Maclin noted, Ferguson leaves unsettled
the question whether a search that primarily focuses on achieving a non-law
enforcement purpose-such as public safety-might still qualify as a
special need even though a secondary purpose is to gather evidence for use
in criminal prosecutions. 393 Allowing the general protection of public
383. See City's Pre-Trial Brief, supra note 274, at 8; NYCLU's Pre-Trial Brief, supra
note 268, at 12. The NYCLU asserted, however, that the special needs exception applies in
"highly unusual circumstances" and that the Supreme Court has yet to rule upon this
doctrine's applicability to antiterrorism search programs. NYCLU's Pre-Trial Brief, supra
note 268, at 12-13.
384. MacWade v. Kelly, No. 05CIV6921, 2005 WL 3338573, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7,
2005) (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997)).
385. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
386. See id.

387. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84 (2001); Mich. Dep't of State Police
v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,450 (1990).
388. See City's Pre-Trial Brief, supra note 274, at 9 ("[P]olice officers conducting
Program inspections would arrest people found carrying illegal substances .... ).
389. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720 (1987) (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
390. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 54 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
391. Maclin, supra note 160, at 115-16.
392. MacWade v. Kelly, No. 05CIV6921, 2005 WL 3338573, at *5 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7,
2005); American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., No. 0411652, 2004 WL 1682859, at *2 (D. Mass. July 28, 2004).

393. Maclin, supra note 160, at 117-18.
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safety to qualify as a special need, even where the searches are conducted
by police to enforce the criminal law, might considerably expand the
doctrine's reach. Most criminal laws have public safety as an ultimate goal.
Consequently, one could argue that any search intended to prevent a violent
crime is primarily intended to protect the public's safety and that the use of
the discovered evidence in a criminal prosecution would merely be a
subsidiary purpose. The warrant preference rule has traditionally applied
394
without regard to the dangerousness of the offense under investigation.
Furthermore, the magnitude of the risk to public safety is not the focus of
the special needs exception; rather the focus is the search's non-law395
enforcement character.
The second and third factors of Professor Maclin's framework-whether
information obtained from the search is made available to law enforcement
and whether law enforcement is involved in designing and implementing
the search program 396 -weigh against characterizing the subway searches
as special needs. The program in New York City was designed and
implemented exclusively by the NYPD, and the NYPD maintains that
contraband found during the course of the search will be used in a criminal
prosecution. 397 In T.L.O. and Griffin, the fruits of the searches were
provided to law enforcement for use in prosecutions, and the Court did not
398
consider this fact to affect whether the special needs doctrine applied.
However, Ferguson suggests that a search designed and conducted by law
enforcement to uncover evidence for use in a criminal prosecution cannot
be excused from the warrant and probable cause requirements on special
needs grounds--even if the ultimate purpose of the intrusion is to deter the
threatened harm.

399

If the Court were to apply the special needs doctrine to the subway
searches despite the heavy involvement of law enforcement, it seems likely
that the subway searches would fall within this "closely guarded category of
constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches." 40 0
Recent and
successful targeting of foreign urban mass transit systems by international
terrorists 40 1 indicate the threat to the public safety to be "substantial and

394. Buffaloe, supra note 212, at 548 ("To conduct a search, a police officer must first
secure a warrant supported by probable cause, whether the crime is writing a check for less
than one dollar or killing thousands of people.").
395. Maclin, supra note 160, at 117-18. However, safety clearly "factors into the special
needs analysis." Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 836 (2002).
396. Maclin, supra note 160, at 116-17.
397. See generally supra notes 274-90, 388.

398. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 870 (1987) (dealing with a probationer charged
with a state-law weapons offense); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 328-29 (1985)
(addressing delinquency charges brought against a student).
399. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 81-84 (2001).
400. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997).
401. See supra notes 255-62 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, this threat is "sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth

'40 3
Amendment's normal requirement of individualized suspicion.
Chandler shows that the Court will evaluate a special needs program's
effectiveness in determining whether the suspicionless search may take
place. 40 4 In Chandler, the Court invalidated Georgia's drug testing
program partly on the grounds that the program was unlikely to be
effective; a candidate could pass the test simply by refraining from drug use
in the weeks prior to the testing date, which was known in advance. 40 5 This
might pose a problem for subway search programs like New York City's.
Although the locations of daily checkpoints are not publicly disclosed,406
the ability to circumvent inspection simply by leaving a guarded station and
entering the system through one of the many unguarded stations calls into
question the program's effectiveness. 4 07 However, the deterrence of drug
use was not a goal of Georgia's one-time drug test. The Court could find,
as did the district court in MacWade, that a random mass transit search
8
injects an element of unpredictability that will deter a terrorist attack.40
Some commentators have criticized the MacWade decision as unduly
deferential to New York City's assertion that the program will deter
terrorism.40 9 Because preventing terrorism is necessarily a compelling
interest, searches implemented for this purpose will nearly always trump
privacy interests unless the courts engage in a serious review of the search
program's efficacy. 4 10 There is no public interest in an ineffective program,
and the government may not "diminish[] personal privacy for a symbol's
4 11
sake."
Even if the subway searches do not violate the criteria set forth in prior
special needs cases, extending the doctrine might make it, as one
commentator has put it, "an exception poised to swallow the warrant
402. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 323.

403. Id.at 318.
404. Id. at 319-20.
405. Id.
406. City's Pre-Trial Brief, supra note 274, at 4.
407. See NYCLU's Pre-Trial Brief, supra note 268, at 14-15.
408. MacWade v. Kelly, No. 05CIV6921, 2005 WL 3338573, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7,
2005) ("[The City's experts] testified persuasively that, because of the random nature of the
Container Inspection Program, i.e., because when and where an inspection will occur is not
revealed in advance, the Program adds uncertainty and unpredictability to the planning and
implementation of a terrorist attack which, in turn, increases the risk of failure and helps to
deter an attack.").
409. Daniel J. Solove, NYC Subway Searches Upheld: A Critique of the Court's
Decision,
Concurring
Opinions,
Dec.
5,
2005,
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2005/12/nycsubwaysear.html.
410. Id.Professor Daniel Solove points out that "[tihe reasonableness of the policy...
depends upon balancing the efficacy of the searches against their intrusiveness" and asserts
that "if the court defers to the government in this regard, it is essentially rubber-stamping the
government in this determination."
411. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322 (1997); see also Nat'l Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 687 (1989) (Scalia, Stevens, J.J., dissenting) (stating that
"the impairment of individual liberties cannot be the means of making a point; that
symbolism ... cannot validate an otherwise unreasonable search").
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preference rule." 4 12 Most cases-and all of the recent ones-invoking this
doctrine have involved drug testing conducted by government employers
and school officials. Under none of these programs were the results of the
tests made available for use in criminal prosecutions. 4 13 Allowing law
enforcement's need to protect the public from criminal terrorist acts to
qualify as4 14"special need" might open the door too wide for suspicionless
searches.
C. The Checkpoint Exception
The subway search could be considered analogous to the roadblock
checkpoint seizure because persons attempting to pass a certain point are
subject to government interference for the purpose of protecting the safety
of others nearby. 4 15 Unlike the special needs doctrine, this exception
unequivocally permits law enforcement officials to conduct the intrusion.
Also, the subway searches arguably satisfy Edmond's threshold rule against
checkpoints that merely serve a general interest in crime control. 4 16 The
searches are not primarily conducted to uncover evidence to be used in
prosecution for violation of antiterrorist criminal laws. Rather, the primary
purpose is to deter and detect terrorist attempts. 4 17 Edmond stated in dicta
that police may establish a checkpoint for the purpose of thwarting an
"imminent terrorist attack," as long as the checkpoint was "appropriately
tailored. '4 18 While the programs in New York and in Boston were
implemented without any specific or imminent threat, the Court's statement
in Edmond might better be characterized as presenting the easy case for
upholding a terrorist checkpoint rather than establishing an imminence
requirement. The validity of the checkpoints upheld in Martinez-Fuerte
and Sitz did not rest upon the imminence of illegal entry or drunk driving.
Rather, the Court noted the significance of the problems of illegal

412. Buffaloe, supra note 212, at 529.
413. See supra notes 193-207 and accompanying text.
414. But see Ronald M. Gould & Simon Stern, Catastrophic Threats and the Fourth
Amendment, 77 S. Cal. L. Rev. 777, 824 (2004) (arguing that the special needs doctrine

should be extended to permit neighborhood house searches to discover a hidden weapon of
mass destruction). The authors conclude that "[b]uilding on the special-needs cases would
provide continuity of precedent and greater protection of individual privacy than would the
construction of an entirely new and ad hoc catastrophic-threat or national-security exception
to probable-cause requirements." Id. at 831-32.
415. See 5 LaFave, supra note 7, § 10.6(c), at 298 (characterizing airport searches as "a
variety of checkpoint, albeit involving people on foot rather than in vehicles").
416. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
417. MacWade v. Kelly, No. 05C1V6921, 2005 WL 3338573, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7,
2005); American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., No. 0411652, 2004 WL 1682859, at *2 (D. Mass. July 28, 2004). However, the Court in Edmond
might have exempted airport searches from this primary purpose requirement by stating that
its holding "does not affect the validity of border searches or searches in airports and
government buildings, where the need for such measures to ensure public safety can be
particularly acute." Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47-48.
418. Id.at44.
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immigration and of vehicular accidents caused by intoxicated drivers. 4 19
The bombings of foreign urban mass transit systems by the same terrorist
organization responsible for the 9/11 attacks suggest that the vulnerability
420
of U.S. systems to terrorist attacks poses just as significant a problem.
Not surprisingly, the application of the roadblock checkpoint exception
also poses several problems. First, this exception has justified only the
42 1
brief detention of motorists; it has never authorized any type of search.
In upholding the border patrol checkpoint, Martinez-Fuertedistinguished a
case decided just a year earlier that had prohibited officials from searching
automobiles detained at checkpoints without probable cause. 422 The Court
has recently reiterated the significance of the distinction between a brief
seizure and a search. 423 Another ground justifying the checkpoint seizures
is that the heavy regulation of automobiles corresponds to a diminished
expectation of privacy. 424 The Court may have to find that a mass transit
passenger's privacy interest is similarly decreased in order to justify
425
application of the roadblock checkpoint exception.
Another potential issue with a program like New York City's is whether
the random selection of passengers rather than searching all of them is
unduly intrusive. 426 On two occasions, the Supreme Court has struck down
suspicionless seizures made by roving patrol stops 42 7 but has permitted or
suggested approval for checkpoints erected for the same purpose where all
motorists are stopped.42 8 The stopping of all motorists is considered less
419. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-57 (1976).
420. Passenger Rail Security, supra note 2, at 10.
421. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455; Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 558.
422. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 555 (distinguishing United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S.
891 (1975)).
423. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 83 n.21 (2001) ("This case also
differs from the handful of seizure cases in which we have applied a balancing test to
determine Fourth Amendment reasonableness .... [T]hose cases involved roadblock
seizures, rather than 'the intrusive search of the body or the home."' (citations omitted)).
424. Compare Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 561 (noting that "one's expectation of
privacy in an automobile and of freedom in its operation are significantly different" from
one's expectation of privacy in the home), with Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662
(1979) ("An individual operating or traveling in an automobile does not lose all reasonable
expectation of privacy simply because the automobile and its use are subject to government
regulation.").
425. Cf Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1 (1984). The Court in this case held that a police
officer's detention of individuals for questioning at an airport before the individuals
attempted to board the plane was not a seizure. Id. at 5-6. In the alternative, the Court found
that there was sufficient suspicion to justify the seizure because at a "major international
airport where, due in part to extensive anti-hijacking surveillance and equipment, reasonable
privacy expectations are of significantly lesser magnitude." Id. at 6. But see Bond v. United
States, 529 U.S. 334, 337 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (holding that a bus passenger possessed a
privacy interest in his baggage, so that a Border Patrol agent's suspicionless manipulation of
it while it was in an overhead compartment violated the Fourth Amendment).
426. See supra notes 279-80 and accompanying text.
427. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
428. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 (stating that the Court's holding did not preclude Delaware
from using less intrusive methods to check motorists' licensing and registration, such as
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intrusive than roving patrol stops for two reasons. First, the "subjective
intrusion" of the seizure is mitigated by the fact that "[a]t traffic
checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, [and]
he can see visible signs of the officers' authority. '4 29 While the officers'
uniforms and posted notices provide indicia of the officers' authority to
conduct subway searches, it is quite likely that a randomly selected
passenger might not see others stopped and might not know the basis of her
selection. Even if New York City's random search program is more akin to
the checkpoint than the roving patrol because NYPD officers are stationary
when conducting searches, 4 30 the Court has never upheld a random
checkpoint seizure, 43 1 and this randomness may make the subway search
too intrusive.
Second, the seizure of all individuals at checkpoints limits the discretion
of officers in selecting whom to seize. 432 While searching every twentieth
passenger may limit discretion just as much as searching all who pass, the
former method may be more readily abused. 433 Deviations from the
numerical selection formula, which may constitute an impermissible use of
discretion, would be very difficult to prove. The randomness may serve as
a subterfuge for the invidious targeting4 34of individuals based upon race, yet
such abuse would likely evade review.
Finally, the checkpoint seizure exception requires the Court to consider
the efficacy of the program in achieving its purpose. 435 The NYCLU's
main challenge was that conducting searches of only consenting individuals
at only a few of New York City's 468 subway stations at a time could not
effectively prevent a terrorist attack; thus the privacy costs to the many
passengers searched produced no offsetting gain in security. 436 Prouse
struck down a suspicionless patrol stop upon a finding that it contributed
very little to highway safety beyond what a suspicion-based regime could

"[q]uestioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops"); see also Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. at 556.
429. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 452-53 (1990) (citing MartinezFuerte,428 U.S. at 558).
430. See supra notes 274-78 and accompanying text.
431. See, e.g., Sitz, 496 U.S. at 456 (Brennan, Marshall, J.J.,
dissenting) ("Today, the
Court rejects a Fourth Amendment challenge to a sobriety checkpoint policy in which police
stop all cars and inspect all drivers for signs of intoxication ....
").
But see Prouse, 440 U.S.
at 664 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (writing separately to emphasize that the Court should
uphold "not purely random stops (such as every 10th car to pass a given point) that equate
with, but are less intrusive than, a 100% roadblock stop").
432. Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 559-60.
433. See 5 LaFave, supra note 7, § 10.8(a), at 345-47.
434. See NYCLU Complaint, supra note 291, at 2 ("[T]he volume of people entering
subway stations and the lack of NYPD control over that volume result in many people being
selected for search in a discretionary and arbitrary manner, which creates the potential for
impermissible racial profiling.").
435. See, e.g., Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450.
436. NYCLU's Pre-Trial Brief, supra note 268, at 14-15.
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achieve. 4 37 However, Sitz took the bite out of the Court's effectiveness
inquiry, declaring that the inquiry is
not meant to transfer from politically accountable officials to the courts
the decision as to which among reasonable alternative law enforcement
techniques should be employed to deal with a serious public danger....
[F]or purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, the choice among such
reasonable alternatives remains with the governmental officials who have
a unique understanding of, and a responsibility for,
limited public
438
resources, including a finite number of police officers.
Similarly, the NYPD's limited resources influence the decision of how
many checkpoints to establish. 4 39 As noted by the district court in
MacWade, the NYCLU took the paradoxical position that a more intrusive
program-one with more checkpoints and compulsory searches-is
required for the subway searches to attain a constitutionally mandated level
of efficacy. 440 After Sitz, the effectiveness inquiry for a checkpoint seizure
requires only that the intrusion be reasonably effective in advancing the
program's ends-a highly deferential standard. 44 1 The court in MacWade
found New York City's program to be reasonably effective in preventing a
terrorist attack despite the apparent ease with which one could avoid a
4 42
search and enter the subway system.
D. The Consent Search Exception
The Davis court alternatively looked at the airport search question as
' 443

"one of 'consent.'

The court explained that

a prospective passenger has a choice: he may submit to a search of his
person and immediate possessions as a condition to boarding; or he may
turn around and leave. If he chooses to proceed, that choice, whether
viewed as a relinquishment of an option to leave or an election to submit
to the search, is essentially a "consent," granting the government a license
to do what 4it44would otherwise be barred from doing by the Fourth
Amendment.

437. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 655-63 (1979).
438. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453-54.
439. City's Pre-Trial Brief, supra note 274, at 3.
440. MacWade v. Kelly, No. 05CIV6921, 2005 WL 3338573, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7,
2005) (noting the NYCLU's "ironic position that less intrusiveness renders the Program less
effective").
441. John M. Copacino, Suspicionless Criminal Seizures After Michigan Department of
State Police v. Sitz, 31 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 215, 243-46 (1994).
442. MacWade, 2005 WL 3338573, at *12 (finding that "[d]efendants effectively

countered [p]laintiffs' argument that the Program is not effective due to the ease with which
one can evade checkpoints and enter the subway system").
443. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 913 (9th Cir. 1973).
444. Id.; accord Gilmore v. Gonzales, No. 04-15736, slip op. 1135, 1159 (9th Cir. Jan.
26, 2006). But see United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1092-93 (E.D.N.Y. 1971)
(rejecting the notion that passengers implicitly consent to a search by proceeding to a
boarding gate after receiving notice of search).
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The district courts in MacWade and American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee did not characterize the subway search programs as consensual.
Instead, the courts viewed the fact that subway riders were apprised of the
potential search and chose to enter the system as minimizing the search's
intrusion and thus making it more reasonable. In MacWade, the court
found that passengers' ability to refuse the search mitigated the level of
intrusion, which tipped the balance in favor of the search program's
reasonableness. 44 5 American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee found
posted notices of the search relevant to measuring the search's intrusiveness
because they "provide[d] an opportunity for persons who do not want to
permit inspection to avoid traveling on the MBTA during the time when
security searches are being conducted. '44 6
Although neither court
considered whether the subway searches were consensual, the searches
resemble Supreme Court consent search precedents where law enforcement
officials have requested to search passengers' luggage at airports and on
44 7
buses.
For example, in New York City, NYPD officers do not command
selected individuals to open their containers. Rather, officers advise
passengers "that their entry into the [subway] system is subject to a
search. '448 Further, the "preferred method for inspecting is to ask the
individual to show the officer what is in the container. '449 There is no
"application of force" or "blocking of exits," factors which the Court in
Drayton deemed significant in finding the search of bus passengers to be
consensual. 45 0 Although nothing in the MacWade opinion or the parties'
submissions indicates that NYPD officials inform selected passengers of
their right to refuse the search and walk away, 4 5 1 the court in Drayton
expressly rejected the notion that such information is needed for a voluntary
4 52
consent.
In Boston, the argument that the searches were consensual may be more
attenuated. The MBTA posted notices that "broadly advised riders that
their carried-on items could be subject to search while they were riding on
MBTA facilities." 45 3 The district court recognized that the MBTA did not
provide notice that all passengers riding on particular trains and buses
passing near the convention center would certainly be searched during those

445. MacWade, 2005 WL 3338573, at *19.
446. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., No. 0411652, 2004 WL 1682859, at *3 (D. Mass. July 28, 2004).
447. See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429
(1991); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1 (1984); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
448. MacWade, 2005 WL 3338573, at *6.
449. Id.
450. Drayton, 536 U.S. at 204.
451. MacWade, 2005 WL 3338573, at *1-*19; City's Pre-Trial Brief, supra note 274, at
3-4.
452. Drayton, 536 U.S. at 206-07.
453. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., No. 0411652, 2004 WL 1682859, at *3 (D. Mass. July 28, 2004).
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four days. 454 However, the absence of such notice did not render the search
unreasonable because the court found that notice was not a "necessary
element" of an administrative search. 4 55 Nothing in the Arab-American
Anti-Discrimination Committee opinion indicates that MBTA police
requested permission to search subway riders bags, 456 which under Drayton
'457
is necessary to "dispel[] inferences of coercion.
The difficulty with characterizing the subway searches as consensual lies
in the fact that entry into the subway system is conditioned upon such
consent. 458 The Supreme Court has struck down a search of a passenger in
an airport terminal, finding the encounter nonconsensual because the
passenger "was never informed that he was free to [refuse the search and]
board his plane if he so chose." 45 9 Although Drayton found express notice
unnecessary, it did clarify that consent means freedom to "terminate the
encounter" rather than freedom to leave, emphasizing that "[a] passenger
may not want to get off a bus if there is a risk it will depart before the
opportunity to reboard. ''4 60 In other words, a consensual search leaves the
individual free to refuse the search and to continue on with his travel plans.
Compelling a prospective subway rider to consent to a search in order to
access public transportation is a form of coercion. 46 1 In fact, some
commentators have argued that in the airport search context, forcing such a
462
choice constitutes an unconstitutional condition on the right to travel.
454. Id.
455. Id. However, Davis clearly contemplated that passengers would receive notice of
the search. The court stated that airport searches were "reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment provided each prospective boarder retains the right to leave rather than submit
to the search." United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 912 (9th Cir. 1973). Passengers
unaware of the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority's ("MBTA") search policy may
have not had such an opportunity to leave. Cf American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.'s
Brief, supra note 310 ("Under the policy, Security Inspections are to be conducted where
practical before persons proceed through the paid entrance area of an MBTA station. In fact,
it is not practical to do this throughout the system and searches take place on the trains
themselves.").
456. American-Arab Anti-DiscriminationComm., 2004 WL 1682859, at *1-*4.
457. Drayton, 536 U.S. at 207.
458. See Note, Airport Security Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 71 Colum. L. Rev.
1039, 1048 (1971) (arguing that airport searches should not be considered as consent
searches).
459. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 503 (1983).
460. Drayton, 536 U.S. at 201.
461. See United States v. Kroll, 481 F.2d 884, 886 (8th Cir. 1973); 5 LaFave, supra note
7, § 10.6(g), at 308.
462. See, e.g., Note, Skyjacking: Constitutional Problems Raised by Anti-Hijacking
Systems, 63 J. Crim. L., Criminology, & Police Sci. 356, 363-64 (1972); cf American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Comm.'s Brief, supra note 310 (citing circuit court opinions prohibiting
the conditioning of a public benefit on the waiver of a constitutional right). But see Gilmore
v. Gonzales, No. 04-15736, slip op. 1135, 1154 (9th Cir. Jan. 26, 2006) (holding that the
right to interstate travel does not prohibit the government from placing restrictions on any
particular mode of transportation); United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 912-13 (9th Cir.
1973) (allowing right to travel to be conditioned upon relinquishment of Fourth Amendment
rights where there is a compelling state interest and search is appropriately tailored). The
Supreme Court has stated that "constitutional concepts of personal liberty ... require that all
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This concern might be even greater in the subway search context because
on the subway cannot afford alternative means of
many who depend
463
transportation.

Another problem with applying a consent analysis is that the Court might
have to engage in a case-by-case evaluation of individual passengers'
subjective state of mind to determine if the consent had actually been
voluntarily given. 4 64 Although the Court has recently focused on objective
factors, 465 the subjective standard established in Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte466 for determining the voluntariness of consent has never been
overruled. 46 7 This standard would burden municipalities wishing to
implement mass transit searches. The validity of each of the thousands of
would depend upon whether
searches conducted pursuant to the program
468
the individual passenger felt coerced.
E. A GeneralReasonableness Standard
Writing for the majority in the Second Circuit airport search case, United
States v. Edwards, Chief Judge Friendly noted that "no one could reconcile
all the views" of the circuit courts that had considered the validity of airport
searches. 469 However, he perceived that "a consensus does seem to be
emerging that an airport search is not to be condemned as violating the
Fourth Amendment simply because it does not precisely fit into one of the
470
previously recognized categories for dispensing with a search warrant."
The opinion then questioned the validity of the warrant preference rule,
noting that this construction of the Fourth Amendment is not commanded
by the Amendment's text:
Surprise has been expressed that the Amendment nowhere connects the
two clauses; it nowhere says in terms that one might expect it to say: that
all searches without a warrant issued in compliance with the condition
citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by
statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement." Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969).
463. Dave Hoffman, Deterrence and Subway Searches, Conglomerate, July 24, 2005,
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2005/07/deterrence-and

.html ("The privacy losses created

by these searches will fall most heavily on poor and working class New Yorkers, who...
will be unable to opt out of the system by regularly taking cabs/town cars instead of the
subway.").

464. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 229 (1973).
465. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
466. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229.
467. See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 208 n.1 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting)
("[C]onsent [must] satisfy the voluntariness test of Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, which
focuses on the nature of a person's subjective understanding, and requires consideration of
the characteristics of the accused [in addition to] the details of the interrogation." (internal
quotation omitted)); see also Simmons, supra note 91, at 782.
468. Cf Simmons, supra note 91, at 774 (criticizing the consent search doctrine as
"meaningless" because "no action taken by anybody in any situation is wholly 'voluntary' or
'involuntary,' but rather is a result of myriad pressures, some internal and some external").
469. United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 498 (2d Cir. 1974).
470. Id.
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specified in the second clause are eo ipso unreasonable under the first....
While the heavy judicial gloss that a warrantless search is invalid unless
within an appropriate "exception" is surely here to stay.. . [n]othing in
the history of the Amendment remotely suggests that the framers would
have wished to prohibit reasonable measures
to prevent the boarding of
47 1
vessels by passengers intent on piracy.

Indeed, the gloss of the warrant preference rule remains, 472 but the Court
has vacillated between this model of Fourth Amendment analysis and a
general reasonableness standard. 4 73 Generally speaking, those valuing law
and order over privacy favor the latter model because it is more flexible
than the warrant preference rule. 474 Thus, a general reasonableness
standard can accommodate more types of government searches and seizures
475
and presumably will exclude evidence in fewer instances.
A general reasonableness approach is attractive for two reasons. First, it
would simplify search and seizure jurisprudence by eliminating the need to
determine in every instance if the warrant requirement applies and whether
one of the dozens of exceptions excuses it. 4 76

Second, this approach is

arguably consistent not only with the Amendment's text, which sets forth
the Reasonableness and Warrant Clauses in the conjunctive, but also with
the Supreme Court's limited discussion of airport searches. The Court's
references to airport searches have emphasized the reasonableness of the
478
intrusion. 4 77 Through the Court's silence about which exception applies,
one might infer that no exception is needed and that reasonableness alone in
the absence of a warrant or probable cause suffices.
471. Id. (internal quotation omitted). Chief Judge Friendly found the administrative
search doctrine "most nearly applicable to the airport search," but stated that "since an
attempt to fold airport searches under the rubric of this type of administrative search would
entail the question of reasonableness.., the issue of reasonableness may as well be faced
directly." Id. at 498 n.5.
472. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987) (rejecting the reasonableness balancing
test and requiring a warrant to pick up stereo equipment and read its serial number); cf Groh
v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004).
473. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 33, at 1468; see also Sundby, supra note 52, at 383
("[T]he Court retain[s] a semblance of coherent fourth amendment analysis only by resorting
to exceptions or an ill-defined balancing test.").
474. See Groh, 540 U.S. at 571-73 (Thomas, Scalia, J.J., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(criticizing the warrant-preference rule and asserting that a search conducted pursuant to
defective warrant was nonetheless reasonable).
475. For a discussion of the exclusionary rule, see Allen et al., supranote 1, at 336-48.
476. Bradley, supra note 33, at 1475 ("The reason that all of these exceptions have grown
up is simple: the clear rule that warrants are required is unworkable and to enforce it would
lead to exclusion of evidence in many cases where the police activity was essentially
reasonable. By its continued adherence to the warrant requirement in theory, though not in
fact, the Court has sown massive confusion among the police and lower courts." (footnote
omitted)).
477. See, e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997) ("[W]here the risk to public
safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank
as 'reasonable'-for example, searches now routine at airports and at entrances to courts and
other official buildings.").
478. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
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There are significant drawbacks to adopting a general reasonableness
standard. As a textual matter, it fails to account for the existence and
applicability of the Warrant Clause. 4 79 Second, as Professor Scott Sundby
points out, such a standard might lead to a proliferation of suspicionless
searches because, unlike the warrant procedure, a reasonableness standard
does not require probable cause or any individualized suspicion.48 0 An
individualized suspicion requirement allows citizens at least some control
over whether the government will interfere with their privacy, because
acting suspiciously is a necessary prerequisite to a search. 48 1 Suspicionless
searches and seizures subject persons involved in innocuous activitiessuch as applying for a government job, driving, and participating in
extracurricular school activities-to an invasion of privacy. 482 A general
reasonableness standard might allow such intrusions to become "a routine

4 83
part of American life."

F. A Sui Generis Exception
The Court might also declare that the terrorist threat to mass
transportation systems merits a unique exception to the warrant and
probable cause requirements. Expanding the list of exceptions to the
warrant requirement poses several problems. First, the proliferation of
exceptions calls into question the wisdom of a general rule that all searches
and seizures must comply with the warrant procedure. Justice Antonin
Scalia is of the opinion that "the 'warrant requirement' [has] become so
'484
Most
riddled with exceptions that it [is] basically unrecognizable.
commentators would agree that the Court's search and seizure
jurisprudence already suffers from a lack of analytical consistency. 485 The
Court's wavering loyalty to, and unprincipled departure from, the warrant
preference rule accounts for much of this confusion. Crafting a new
exception might exacerbate the problem.

479. Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment is Worse than the
Disease, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 21 (1994) (arguing that "[a]n interpretation that detaches the

Reasonableness Clause from the Warrant Clause runs the risk of making the Warrant Clause
virtually useless"').

480. Scott E. Sundby, Protecting the Citizen "Whilst He Is Quiet": Suspicionless
Searches, "Special Needs," and General Warrants, 74 Miss. L.J. 501, 511 (2004)
("[B]ecause the generalized-reasonableness approach does not view probable cause as an
essential prerequisite, the role of individualized suspicion lost some of its Fourth
Amendment swagger.").
481. Id. at 511-12.
482. Id. at 512.
483. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,42 (2000).
484. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
485. Erik G. Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 Duke L.J. 787, 788 (1999)
("Academics of all stripes agree that search and seizure law is a 'mess."'); Samuel C.
Rickless, The Coherence of Orthodox Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence,15 Geo. Mason U.
Civ. Rts. L.J. 261, 261 (2005) ("If there is any statement to which virtually all constitutional
scholars would agree, it is that orthodox Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is a theoretical
mess .... ); Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 46, at 20.
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A second problem with this approach is that the ad hoc recognition of
exceptions to the warrant requirement provides little guidance to the lower
courts, which will inevitably review new fact situations that do not track
narrowly defined exceptions. 486 If an antiterrorism mass transportation
search exception is recognized, would searches conducted at entrances of
courthouses and other public buildings to exclude weapons, which have
487
similarly evaded Supreme Court review, become part of this exception?
Also, the government might identify new areas as subject to a high risk of
terrorist attack. In such cases, lower courts would have little guidance on
whether a mass transit antiterrorism exception should cover all searches
where there is a credible terrorist threat. The Court has previously rejected
a broad "domestic security" exception to the warrant and probable cause
48 8
requirements.
An advantage of recognizing searches on mass transit systems to prevent
terrorism as a sui generis exception, rather that folding it into the other
doctrines, is that it maintains the integrity of the other exceptions. As one
commentator on the airport search cases asserted: "Defining a new
exception to the warrant requirement would... preserve the integrity of the
existing exceptions, for it would avoid extending them beyond their initial
justifications to cover an entirely new fact situation." 489 In order to avoid
further obfuscation of what is "administrative" or "special" about searches
permitted by other doctrines, the Court could find that "the danger alone"
presented by terrorism, 490 and the fact that the traditional standard is unable
to achieve "acceptable results" in deterring it, justifies departure from the
49 1
general rule.

486. See Bookspan, supra note 27, at 475.
487. See, e.g., Justice v. Elrod, 832 F.2d 1048 (7th Cir. 1987) (upholding a search at a
civic center); McMorris v. Alioto, 567 F.2d 897, 898 (9th Cir. 1978) (upholding searches at
courthouse entrances).
488. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 316-317 (1972) (rejecting
the creation of a broad "domestic security" exception allowing warrantless wiretap
surveillance because "Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly be guaranteed if
domestic security surveillances may be conducted solely within the discretion of the
Executive Branch"). But see U.S. Dep't of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the
Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the President (2006), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/nsa/dojnsall906wp.pdf [hereinafter DOJ Domestic
Spying Memo]. The DOJ asserts that the President has authority to conduct warrantless
wiretaps within the United States for foreign intelligence purposes under his inherent Article
II powers as the commander in chief and under the Authorization for the Use of Military
Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001) (reprinted in a note to 50
U.S.C.A. § 1541 (West Supp. 2005). DOJ Domestic Spying Memo, supra, at 6-17. The DOJ
points out that the Supreme Court in Keith declined to address whether the Fourth
Amendment prohibits warrantless wiretaps of agents of foreign powers "acting within or
without this country." Id.at 8 (citing Keith, 407 U.S. at 308, 321-22, 322 n.20). See
generally James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al.
489. Note, The ConstitutionalityofAirport Searches, supra note 235, at 153.
490. See United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974).
491. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967).
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A narrowly drawn exception specific to the threat of mass transportation
terrorism also avoids the danger that by expanding other exceptions,
suspicionless police searches might become commonplace. For example,
the roadblock checkpoint exception could easily be extended to permit not
only temporary seizures of motorists but also searches of their automobiles,
once the exception is applied to searches of passenger luggage. Applying
the special needs doctrine would leave little doubt that searches designed
and implemented by police to prevent crime fall within the scope of the
doctrine.
With the removal of these limitations, only an amorphous
balancing test would restrain the proliferation of suspicionless searches.
In contrast, a sui generis exception would be exclusively applicable to
searches for explosives or other weapons for the purpose of preventing
terrorism. The parameters of the exception would not be rigid but would
likely respond to factors such as the search technology employed, the type
of weapons searched for, and the mode of transportation identified as
subject to a credible terrorist threat. Thus, the exception might expand to
cover a variety of different search methods employed in new contexts.
However, searches implemented for a purpose other than the prevention of
mass transit terrorism would have to find another exception or comply with
the warrant and probable cause requirements. Therefore, crafting a unique
exception would invalidate more warrantless and suspicionless searches
than would the expansion of the other doctrines. Those doctrines permit
intrusions targeting any social harm, subject only to the vague limitation
that the intrusion's purpose be distinct from the needs of ordinary criminal
law enforcement.
Camara provides a guidepost for determining whether the Court should
recognize an exception to the warrant requirement:
In assessing whether the public interest demands creation of a general
exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, the question
is not whether the public interest justifies the type of search in question,
but whether the authority to search should be evidenced by a warrant,
which in turn depends in part upon whether the burden of obtaining a
warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the
49 2
search.
Requiring a warrant for searches of individual passengers in airports and on
urban mass transit systems might frustrate the government's interest in
conducting the search. Given the need to screen all or many individuals,
such a requirement would shut airports and subways down. The Court
could take Camara's approach 493 and authorize "area-warrants" for the
locations where checkpoints are established. In New York City, the
decision about the number of checkpoints to establish and their location

492. Id. at 533.
493. Id. at 539.
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494
depends on day-to-day assessments of risks based upon intelligence.
Details such as the frequency of searches at a particular checkpoint is set by
a supervising officer after consideration of conditions such as the number of
individuals passing through the checkpoint and the number of officers
available. 4 95 Such a program requires flexibility and might be frustrated by
requiring a warrant. Of course, a warrant could preapprove a range of
permissible options or set out more general guidelines for officers to follow,
and an exception might be made for departures from pre-authorized
standards in response to exigent circumstances. The search program in
Boston seems more amenable to the warrant procedure because the need to
search was known in advance and required only searches on routes passing
by the Fleet Center on the496 four days that the Democratic National

Convention was taking place.

A better question is whether "such searches when authorized and
conducted without a warrant procedure [would] lack the traditional
'49 7
safeguards which the Fourth Amendment guarantees to the individual.
By defining the lawful scope of a search, a warrant apprises the targeted
49 8
individual of the search's legality and limits the discretion of the officer.
Both the use of a numerical formula to randomly select passengers and the
search of all passengers on particular trains and buses limit the officer's
discretion in choosing whom to search.
Substituting a magistrate's
judgment seems unnecessary because no judgment is used:
If the
program's protocol is followed, objective factors alone determine who is
selected for search.
As to providing notice of the officer's lawful authority to search, a
warrant would still have utility. Even if passengers receive notice that the
police intend to search their belongings, without a warrant the legality of
such a search is not known. 4 99 However, as seen in New York and Boston,
a broad and well-publicized search program tends to draw legal challenges
from civil liberties groups seeking to enjoin it. This adversarial setting
offers greater assurances than an ex parte warrant application that courts

494. MacWade v. Kelly, No. 05CIV6921, 2005 WL 3338573, at *7, n.13 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.

7, 2005) (noting that on certain days the number of checkpoints were increased in response
to threats against the subway system).
495. City's Pre-Trial Brief, supra note 274, at 3-4.
496. See supra notes 309-12 and accompanying text.
497. Camara,387 U.S. at 534.
498. Cf United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 565-66 (1976).
499. Camarastated,
Under the present system, when the inspector demands entry, the occupant has no
way of knowing whether enforcement of the municipal code involved requires
inspection of his premises, no way of knowing the lawful limits of the inspector's
power to search, and no way of knowing whether the inspector himself is acting
under proper authorization.
387 U.S. at 532.
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will carefully review the search's reasonableness. 500 These arguments all
suggest that the Court could create an exception for suspicionless searches
on mass transit systems, as it did in Martinez-Fuerte for checkpoint
50 2
seizures 50 1 and in TL.O. for searches of students by school officials.

III. THE VALIDITY OF SUSPICIONLESS SUBWAY SEARCHES TO PREVENT
MASS TRANSIT TERRORISM

A. The Supreme Court Should Recognize Suspicionless Searches on Mass
TransitSystems as a Sui Generis Exception to the Warrant and
IndividualizedSuspicion Requirement
The district court in American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee
found no reason to have distinct Fourth Amendment analyses for the
screening procedures of urban mass transit systems and airports. 50 3 In both
contexts, the personal luggage of travelers is searched in order to prevent
persons from carrying dangerous weapons aboard. Yet it remains unclear
whether the Supreme Court would excuse the subway searches from the
warrant and probable cause requirements on grounds that they are
50 5
administrative searches; 50 4 that there is a special need for the searches;
that the searches are similar to roadblock checkpoints; 50 6 that they are
consensual; 50 7 that the searches are simply reasonable; 50 8 or because the
threat of terrorist attacks upon mass transportation systems merits50 a9 sui
generis exception to the Fourth Amendment's ordinary requirements.
Determining which exception applies to searches such as those
implemented in New York and in Boston is important for two reasons.
First, the Court has not provided a coherent set of rules for determining
when a warrant and probable cause are required and when the alternative
"reasonableness" balancing standard applies. 5 10 At times, the Court has
employed the balancing test to determine the reasonableness of a search
without mentioning the warrant preference rule or providing an explanation
for choosing one model over the other. 5 11 A coherent doctrine that explains
500. As the court in MacWade put it, "[T]he use of suspicionless searches always must be
examined carefully, and Plaintiffs have played an important (vigilant) role in this process."
MacWade v. Kelly, No. 05CIV6921, 2005 WL 3338573, at *1 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 7,2005).
501. Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 561.
502. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985).
503. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., No. 0411652, 2004 WL 1682859, at *2 (D. Mass. July 28, 2004).
504. See supra notes 342-82 and accompanying text.

505. See supranotes 383-414 and accompanying text.
506. See supra notes 415-42 and accompanying text.

507. See supra notes 443-68 and accompanying text.
508. See supra notes 469-83 and accompanying text.
509. See supranotes 484-502 and accompanying text.
510. See Bradley, supra note 33, at 1475.

511. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
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all exceptions to the general rule would add consistency to Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. Second, the exception applied might serve as a
barometer indicating the strength of the warrant preference rule. An
exception that is broad and vague, like the "special needs" doctrine, would
allow application of the balancing test greater expansion, whereas a
narrower exception would do more to limit when the balancing test applies.
Searches to prevent terrorism on mass transit systems should not be
folded into any existing exception. The administrative search exception
permits warrantless and suspicionless searches of business premises in
highly regulated industries. 5 12 If the Court were to endorse a more
expansive definition of "administrative," 5 13 this would tend towards a
dichotomy in which only searches conducted pursuant to a criminal
investigation would be subject to the requirements of the Warrant Clause.
Likewise, the Court has recently limited the scope of the special needs
doctrine to exclude search programs designed and implemented by police
for the purposes of criminal law enforcement. 514 If this limitation is
recanted to make room for subway searches, then almost any police search
that both enhances public safety and collects evidence for use in criminal
prosecutions could be excused from the strictures of the warrant procedure.
The roadblock checkpoint exception permits brief detentions of
motorists. 5 15 Expanding this exception to sanction full-blown searches
would be contrary to decades of precedent 5 16 and would permit a
significantly greater intrusion.
Nor should the searches be considered consensual. Conditioning one's
right to use public transportation on submission to a search employs a level
5 17
of coercion inconsistent with any plausible understanding of consent.
Finally, adoption of a general reasonableness standard would eliminate the
protections of the warrant procedure altogether. The Court in Edmond
stated that searches without any measure of individualized suspicion are
5 18
rare exceptions appropriate only in "limited circumstances."
Abandoning the warrant preference rule in favor of a general
reasonableness standard, which contains no built-in requirement of
individualized suspicion, could make suspicionless searches "a routine part
'5 19
of American life."
Recognizing the airport and subway searches as a sui generis exception is
the best option for two reasons. First, unlike the other approaches
discussed, such a characterization furthers rather than undermines the
doctrinal consistency of search and seizure jurisprudence. 5 20 Extending
512.
513.
514.
515.
516.
517.
518.
519.
520.

See supra notes 110-22 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 343-52 and accompanying text.
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 83-84 (2001).
See supra notes 123-58 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 421-24 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 458-63 and accompanying text.
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000).
Id. at 41-42.
See supranote 489 and accompanying text.
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other exceptions beyond the factual circumstances that originally justified
them or redefining consent would add greater uncertainty into the law.
Also, recognizing a new exception to the warrant preference rule is more
consistent with precedent than abandoning it in favor of a general
reasonableness standard.
Adopting a narrow exception, rather than expanding upon a broad
exception such as the special needs doctrine, also moves the Fourth
Amendment back toward the warrant preference model. Requiring a
warrant and a showing of probable cause before a search occurs generally
affords greater protections to privacy.5 2 1 Ex post reviews of warrantless
searches typically take place at suppression hearings during criminal
trials. 522 At this point, judges are likely to undervalue privacy interests to
avoid the exclusion of incriminating evidence that would allow a charged
suspect to go free. 523 Furthermore, searches that do not result in criminal
prosecutions generally evade court review. 524 A narrow exception ensures
that more searches will be subject to the warrant requirement. Recognition
of a sui generis exception for mass transit searches takes judicial notice of
the fact that terrorism is a unique threat. In combating this threat, law
enforcement officials should not be constrained by ordinary limitations.
B. The PoliticalProcessProvides an Adequate Safeguard when a Search
Affects Equally the Privacy Interests of a Majority
While identifying which exception to the warrant and probable cause
requirements applies is an important step in evaluating a search, it is just the
first step. Once an exception is found to apply, the validity of a subway
search usually depends upon its reasonableness, which is measured by
balancing the government need to conduct the search against the intrusion
upon privacy effected by it. The outcome of this highly factual inquiry will
depend upon the specific features of the mass transit search program under
consideration. However, "representation reinforcement" theory makes a
strong case that the Court's review should be deferential in cases such as
5
this. 52
The probable cause requirement seeks to limit the discretion of officials
and prevent them from singling out individuals for intrusion without good
reason. However, general search programs such as New York City's and
Boston's, which do not grant officials discretion in selecting whom to
search, do not pose a threat of the arbitrary abuse of police authority. 526
521. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
522. Allen et al., supra note 1, at 335-36.
523. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964) (warrantless arrest "bypasses the safeguards
provided by an objective predetermination of probable cause, and substitutes instead the far
less reliable procedure of an after-the-event justification for the arrest or search, too likely to
be subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment").
524. See Allen et al., supra note 1, at 336.
525. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
526. See supra notes 279-82, 324 and accompanying text.
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Such programs spread the privacy costs of maintaining security across a
In a sense they are democratically
broad swath of a community.
reasonable: The subway search programs, although enacted by local
executive agencies rather than local legislatures, 527 affect a majority of the
people in the communities in which the searches are conducted. If the
majority found the privacy costs of preventing terrorism on mass transit
systems to be unreasonable, then the program can be rescinded through the
political process. Although the suspicionless searches conducted prior to
the founding era inspired the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, these
colonists by a government that was not
searches were imposed upon
52 8
accountable to the people.
Courts still must play a vigilant role in ensuring that a proper balance is
struck. First, the courts should scrutinize general search programs to ensure
that they are tailored to meet a genuine terrorist threat and that they do not
serve merely as a pretext for ordinary criminal law enforcement. The
political process would not serve as an adequate check if the public did not
have accurate information allowing it to understand the cost-benefit
calculus in balancing security and privacy. One way for courts to prevent
the use of antiterrorism search programs for ordinary law enforcement
would be to exclude the use of evidence of crimes unrelated to terrorism
produced by the searches. 529 Second, courts should make sure that
statutory or administrative safeguards that limit the discretion of officials
are enforced, lest the random search devolve into one subjecting individuals
to the unbridled discretion of police. In order for the subway search to be
reasonable, it must spread the privacy costs evenly throughout a community
and cannot impose a disproportionate burden on any particular group. Such
neutrality can be assured by implementing technology allowing police to
search all passengers carrying baggage, as is done at the airport, 530 or to
record the selection process so that there exists proof of its randomness.
CONCLUSION

Terrorism poses a threat not only to our national security, but also to our
civil liberties. Officials may be overzealous in seeking to prevent a terrorist
threat or may use the threat as a pretext to implement measures that the
Fourth Amendment would otherwise prohibit. On the other hand, the
judiciary should not prevent communities from protecting themselves or
from experimenting in methods to improve security. In drawing a proper
527. See supra notes 266, 309 and accompanying text.
528. See Davies, supra note 15, at 561 (noting that the conventional history of the Fourth
Amendment is rooted in "episodes of controversy regarding search and arrest authority that
preceded the American Revolution").
529. See, e.g., United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1281 (5th Cir. 1973) ("Where
special circumstances are allowed to reduce the ordinary conditions precedent to a lawful
search there should be special safeguards to see that the opportunity is not abused .... [The]
same prophylactic principle that dictates exclusion of property unlawfully seized should be
employed to temper possibly overzealous airport searches." (citations omitted)).
530. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
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line, the Supreme Court should employ an analysis that does not diminish
the doctrinal consistency of an already confused search and seizure
jurisprudence by stretching existing exceptions to the warrant and probable
cause requirements.
Nor should the Court water down the Fourth
Amendment's protections by overlooking coercion or adopting a
reasonableness standard for all types of searches. Recognizing a unique
exception for the credible threat of terrorism on mass transit systems
enhances the integrity of search and seizure law and best preserves the
protections afforded by generally requiring searches to be pre-authorized by
a warrant and supported by probable cause.
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